archive-edu.com » EDU » C » CORNELL.EDU

Total: 1513

Choose link from "Titles, links and description words view":

Or switch to "Titles and links view".
  • GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
    against that act committed prior to the adoption of the Hepburn law And it is urged that this result is demonstrated not only by the clause of the Hepburn law re enacting the Elkins act but also by other provisions of the Hepburn law interpreted in the light of the principles of construction which are made applicable by operation of the general law that is Rev Stat 13 U S Comp Stat 1901 p 6 In considering these contentions in their ultimate aspect it is clear that to dispose of them requires us in any event to interpret the Hepburn law and to determine how far the re enactment by that law of the provisions of the Elkins act operates to prevent prosecutions for offenses committed prior to the date when the Hepburn law was enacted We come therefore at once to that question In doing so to disembarrass the analysis from what may be an irrelevant and certainly a confusing consideration we concede for the sake of argument only that the effect of the amendment and re enactment of the Elkins act by 2 of the Hepburn law was to repeal the Elkins act and in the light of this concession we propose to determine whether the right to prosecute for any prior offense committed before the going into effect of the Hepburn law was lost by reason of the adoption of that law We must read the Hepburn law in the light of 13 of the Revised Statutes which provides as follows Sec 13 The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty forfeiture or liability incurred under such statute unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty forfeiture or liability This provision but embodies 4 of the act approved February 25 1871 16 Stat at L 431 chap 71 U S Comp Stat 1901 p 6 which was entitled An Act Prescribing the Form of the Enacting and Resolving Clauses of Acts and Resolutions of Congress and Rules for the Construction Thereof As the section of the Revised Statutes in question has only the force of a statute its provisions cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested either expressly or by necessary implication in a subsequent enactment But while this is true the provisions of 13 are to be treated as if incorporated in and as a part of subsequent enactments and therefore under the general principles of construction requiring if possible that effect be given to all the parts of a law the section must be enforced unless either by express declaration or necessary implication arising from the terms of the law as a whole it results that the legislative mind will be set at naught by giving effect to the provisions of 13 For the sake of brevity we do not stop to refer to the many cases from state courts of last resort dealing with the operation of general state statutes like unto 13 Rev Stat Because we think the views just stated are obvious and their correctness is established by a prior decision of this court concerning that section United States v Reisinger 128 U S 398 32 L ed 480 9 Sup Ct Rep 99 The Hepburn law is entitled An Act to Amend an Act Entitled An Act to Regulate Commerce Approved February Fourth Eighteen Hundred and Eighty seven 24 Stat at L 379 chap 104 U S Comp Stat 1901 p 3154 and All Acts Amendatory Thereof and to Enlarge the Powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission The law is comprehensive It undoubtedly as we have said in the 2d section amends and re enacts the Elkins act and enlarges in important particulars the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission and changes the procedure in various ways essential to the conduct of controversies before the Commission Besides the act in some respects modifies the means of enforcing the orders of the Commission in the courts of the United States the right of appeal the judgment as to costs attorneys fees etc The crucial portion of the act for the purposes of the present inquiry is 10 which provides That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed but the amendments herein provided for shall not affect causes now pending in courts of the United States but such causes shall be prosecuted to a conclusion in the manner heretofore provided by law Clearly the mere repeal of conflicting laws is in no way repugnant to the provisions of 13 of the Revised Statutes and therefore standing alone leaves no room for contending that the enactment of the Hepburn law destroyed the effect of 13 The difficulty of construction if any arises from the words following the general repealing clause But the amendments herein provided for shall not affect causes now pending in courts of the United States but such causes shall be prosecuted to a conclusion in the manner heretofore provided by law These words we think do not expressly or by fair implication conflict with the general rule established by 13 Rev Stat since by their very terms they are concerned with the application to proceedings pending in the courts of the United States of the new methods of procedure created by the Hepburn law Any other construction would necessitate expunging the words shall be prosecuted to a conclusion in the manner heretofore provided by law This follows because if it were to be held that the intent and object of the lawmaker in dealing with cases pending in the courts of the United States was solely to depart as to all but such pending cases from the general rule of Rev Stat 13 then the provision as to future proceedings would be

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/208/452 (2012-11-09)
    Open archived version from archive


  • Meirl Gilbert NEAL, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
    Chapman supra at 460 461 111 S Ct at 1925 Focusing on the pure drug however often allowed retail traffickers who supplied street markets with mixed or diluted drugs ready for consumption to receive sentences lighter than what Congress deemed necessary Id at 461 111 S Ct at 1925 In passing the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986 Pub L 99 570 100 Stat 3207 Congress adopted a market oriented approach to punishing drug trafficking under which the total quantity of what is distributed rather than the amount of pure drug involved is used to determine the length of the sentence Chapman supra at 461 111 S Ct at 1925 H R Rep No 99 845 pt 1 pp 11 12 17 19 86 The Act provided for mandatory minimum sentences based on the weight of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of various controlled substances including LSD 21 U S C 841 b 1 A i viii and B i viii Trafficking in 10 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing LSD earns the offender at least 10 years in prison 841 b 1 A v In Chapman we interpreted the provision of the Act that provided a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for trafficking in an LSD mixture or substance that weighed one gram or more see 841 b 1 B v We construed mixture and substance to have their ordinary meaning observing that the terms had not been defined in the statute or the Sentencing Guidelines and had no distinctive common law meaning 500 U S at 461 462 111 S Ct at 1925 1926 Reasoning that the LSD is diffused among the fibers of the paper and cannot be distinguished from the blotter paper nor easily separated from it id at 462 111 S Ct at 1926 we held that the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD is determinative under the statute id at 468 111 S Ct at 1929 Petitioner contends that the method approved in Chapman is no longer appropriate In his view the Commission intended its dose based method to supplant the actual weight method used in Chapman and we should not presume that the Commission would recognize two inconsistent schemes for sentencing LSD traffickers cf 1995 USSG 2D1 1 comment backg d stating purposes of making offense levels in 2D1 1 proportional to the levels established by statute and providing a logical sentencing structure for drug offenses Petitioner concedes as he must that the Commission does not have the authority to amend the statute we construed in Chapman He argues nonetheless that the Commission is the agency charged with interpretation of penalty statutes and expert in sentencing matters so its construction of 841 b 1 should be given deference See Chevron U S A Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council Inc 467 U S 837 104 S Ct 2778 81 L Ed 2d 694 1984 Congress intended the Commission s rulemaking to respond to judicial decisions in developing a coherent sentencing regime see Braxton v United States 500 U S 344 348 111 S Ct 1854 1857 1858 114 L Ed 2d 385 1991 so petitioner contends deference is appropriate even though the Commission s interpretation postdated Chapman In the alternative he urges that we reassess Chapman in light of the Commission s revised method which was formed from careful study of retail drug markets Although Chapman established that the weight of the blotter paper must be taken into account it did not address how courts should do so The Commission has filled the gap petitioner maintains by assigning a constructive weight to the LSD and carrier for each dose While acknowledging that the Commission s expertise and the design of the Guidelines may be of potential weight and relevance in other contexts we conclude that the Commission s choice of an alternative methodology for weighing LSD does not alter our interpretation of the statute in Chapman In any event principles of stare decisis require that we adhere to our earlier decision The Commission was born of congressional disenchantment with the vagaries of federal sentencing and of the parole system Mistretta v United States 488 U S 361 366 109 S Ct 647 651 652 102 L Ed 2d 714 1989 discussing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and its legislative history The Commission is directed to establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that meet congressional goals set forth in 18 U S C 3553 a 2 and that within a regime of individualized sentencing eliminate unwarranted disparities in punishment of similar defendants who commit similar crimes See 28 U S C 991 b 1 A B Congress also c harged the Commission with the duty to measure and monitor the effectiveness of various sentencing penal and correctional practices 991 b 2 In fulfilling its mandate the Commission has the authority to promulgate review and revise binding guidelines to establish a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants according to various specified factors among others Mistretta 488 U S at 368 109 S Ct at 653 internal quotation marks omitted see 28 U S C 994 a b c and o Like 21 U S C 841 b 1 the Sentencing Guidelines calibrate the punishment of drug traffickers according to the quantity of drugs involved in the offense From their inception in 1987 the Guidelines have used a detailed Drug Quantity Table as a first step in determining the sentence See 1995 USSG 2D1 1 c 1987 USSG 2D1 1 The current Table has 17 tiers each with specified weight ranges for different controlled substances The weight ranges reflect the Commission s assessment of equivalent culpability among defendants who traffic in different types of drugs and so all defendants in the same tier are assigned the same base offense level See 1995 USSG 2 D1 1 c Once the base offense level is adjusted for

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/516/284 (2012-11-09)
    Open archived version from archive

  • REICHELDERFER et al., Commissioners of District of Columbia, v. QUINN et al. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
    L Ed 211 2 A L R 293 with Cheney Bros v Doris Silk Corporation C C A 35 F 2d 279 The case is clear where the question is not of private rights alone but the value was both created and diminished as an incident of the operations of the government For if the enjoyment of a benefit thus derived from the public acts of government were a source of legal rights to have it perpetuated the powers of government would be exhausted by their exercise The case of a park is not unique as the court below seems to have thought 3 See Quinn v Dougherty 58 App D C 339 30 F 2d 749 751 It has often been decided that when lands are acquired by a governmental body in fee and dedicated by statute to park purposes it is within the legislative power to change the use Clark v City of Providence 16 R I 337 15 A 763 1 L R A 725 Mowry v City of Providence 16 R I 422 16 A 511 Seattle Land Improvement Co v Seattle 37 Wash 274 79 P 780 Reichling v Covington Lumber Co 57 Wash 225 106 P 777 135 Am St Rep 976 see Higginson v Treasurer etc of Boston 212 Mass 583 99 N E 523 42 L R A N S 215 or to make other disposition of the land Wright v Walcott 238 Mass 432 131 N E 291 18 A L R 1242 see Brooklyn Park Commissioners v Armstrong 45 N Y 234 245 6 Am Rep 70 compare East Chicago Co v City of East Chicago 171 Ind 654 87 N E 17 Whitney v New York supra Eldridge v City of Binghamton 120 N Y 309 24 N E 462 The abutting owner cannot complain the damage suffered by him though greater in degree than that of the rest of the public is the same in kind See United States v Welch 217 U S 333 339 30 S Ct 527 54 L Ed 787 28 L R A N S 385 19 Ann Cas 680 Second The fact that lands including those now owned by respondents were assessed for benefits as directed by the Rock Creek Park Act leads to no different conclusion Respondents urge that the special benefits required to be assessed included those accruing from the perpetual maintenance of the park that by virtue of the assessment they have paid for the right to enjoy those benefits in perpetuity We may assume that the landowners acquired rights commensurate with the assessments authorized But the statute does not purport to place restrictions on the park lands in their favor and the decision of this court sustaining the constitutionality of the assessment provision Wilson v Lambert 168 U S 611 18 S Ct 217 42 L Ed 599 gives no hint that among the benefits for which they were required to pay was a right against the government to have the lands forever used as a park All that the statute says is that the lands acquired shall be perpetually dedicated as a park for the enjoyment of the people of the United States section 1 and that benefits shall be assessed section 6 Statutes said to restrict the power of government by the creation of private rights are like other public grants to be strictly construed for the protection of the public interest Charles River Bridge v Warren Bridge 11 Pet 420 544 548 9 L Ed 773 Christ Church v County of Philadelphia 24 How 300 16 L Ed 602 Knoxville Water Co v Knoxville 200 U S 22 33 26 S Ct 224 50 L Ed 353 Larson v South Dakota 278 U S 429 49 S Ct 196 73 L Ed 441 Thus construed the dedication of the park a declaration of a present purpose does not imply a promise to neighboring landowners that the park would be continued in perpetuity Cf Newton v Commissioners supra The benefit of a governmental obligation which the statute neither expresses nor implies obviously was not to be assessed We think that the benefits intended must be taken to be those obvious advantages which would accrue to lands in the vicinity of a park because of their location and which would be reflected in their market value even though there were no guaranty that the park would be continued for any particular length of time 4 See Wilson v Lambert supra page 617 of 168 U S 18 S Ct 217 cf Susquehanna Power Co v State Tax Commission of Maryland 283 U S 291 296 51 S Ct 434 75 L Ed 1042 Burbank v Fay 65 N Y 57 64 So it was held in Thayer v City of Boston D C 206 F 969 where contentions very similar to those made here were rejected See also Brooklyn Park Commissioners v Armstrong supra page 245 of 45 N Y The same result has been reached with regard to the assessment of benefits arising from other types of public improvements Whitney v New York supra page 246 of 96 N Y City of Chicago v Union Building Ass n 102 Ill 379 397 40 Am Rep 598 Kean v City of Elizabeth 54 N J Law 462 24 A 495 affirmed 55 N J Law 337 26 A 939 see Home for Aged Women v Commonwealth 202 Mass 422 429 430 89 N E 124 24 L R A N S 79 1 Nichols Eminent Domain 2d Ed 116 and is implicit in the statement frequently made that such assessments are an exercise of the taxing power See Bauman v Ross 167 U S 548 588 17 S Ct 966 42 L Ed 270 Wilson v Lambert supra page 614 of 168 U S 18 S Ct 217 Memphis Charleston Ry v Pace 282 U S 241 245 51 S Ct 108 75 L Ed 315 The

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/287/315 (2012-11-09)
    Open archived version from archive

  • Carlos MARCELLO, Petitioner, v. John M. BONDS, Officer in Charge, United States Immigration and NaturalizationService. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
    in the regulations is the privilege of the alien to be represented by counsel of his own choosing Section 6 a of the Administrative Procedure Act bestows a similar privilege on any person compelled to appear in person before the agency 7 The regulations under 242 b must also provide that the alien be given a reasonable opportunity to present and examine evidence and to cross examine witnesses The same ground is covered in 7 c of the Administrative Procedure Act 8 The regulations promulgated under 242 b must require that decisions of deportability be based upon reasonable substantial and probative evidence To the same effect is 7 c of the Administrative Procedure Act 9 Finally in addition to the requirements of 242 b there is the direction of 101 b 4 of the Immigration Act that the special inquiry officer shall be subject to such supervision as the Attorney General shall prescribe This covers the same question as the portion of 5 c of the Administrative Procedure Act dealing with the supervision and control of hearing officers From the Immigration Act s detailed coverage of the same subject matter dealt with in the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act it is clear that Congress was setting up a specialized administrative procedure applicable to deportation hearings drawing liberally on the analogous provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and adapting them to the particular needs of the deportation process The same legislators Senator McCarran and Congressman Walter sponsored both the Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration Act and the framework of the latter indicates clearly that the Administrative Procedure Act was being used as a model But it was intended only as a model and when in this very particularized adaptation there was a departure from the Administrative Procedure Act based on novel features in the deportation process surely it was the intention of the Congress to have the deviation apply and not the general model Were the courts to ignore these provisions and look only to the Administrative Procedure Act the painstaking efforts detailed above would be completely meaningless Congress could have accomplished as much simply by stating that there should be a hearing to determine the question of deportability Section 242 b expressly states The procedure herein prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section That this clear and categorical direction was meant to exclude the application of the Administrative Procedure Act is amply demonstrated by the legislative history of the Immigration Act The original bills included statements to the effect that the 242 b procedures were to be exclusive n otwithstanding any other law including the Administrative Procedure Act S 3455 81st Cong 2d Sess S 716 82d Cong 1st Sess H R 2379 82d Cong 1st Sess The notwithstanding clause was dropped in later versions of the Act and did not appear in the bills reported out of committee or in the statute as finally enacted S 2055 82d Cong H R 5678 82d Cong S 2550 82d Cong The deletion is nowhere explained but it is possible that the phrase was considered unnecessary and perhaps inappropriate as a description as 242 b became more detailed encompassing in its particularization the greater part of the Administrative Procedure Act s hearing provisions In the Senate Report accompanying the revised bill it is stated that 242 b sets up special procedures for deportation proceedings that these are made exclusive and that the exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act in the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951 is repealed because it is no longer necessary S Rep No 1137 82d Cong 2d Sess p 28 The House Report is to the same effect stating that the prescribed deportation proceedings shall be the sole and exclusive procedure notwithstanding the provisions of any other law H R Rep No 1365 82d Cong 2d Sess p 58 Throughout the debates it is made clear that the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply directly but that its provisions have been specially adapted to meet the needs of the deportation process See particularly the detailed statement of Senator McCarran 98 Cong Rec 5625 5626 wherein he recognizes a departure from the dual examiner provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act the very section here in issue Exemptions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement in 12 of the Act that modifications must be express cf Shaughnessy v Pedreiro 349 U S 48 75 S Ct 591 But we cannot ignore the background of the 1952 immigration legislation its laborious adaptation of the Administrative Procedure Act to the deportation process the specific points at which deviations from the Administrative Procedure Act were made the recognition in the legislative history of this adaptive technique and of the particular deviations and the direction in the statute that the methods therein prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for deportation proceedings Unless we are to require the Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act we must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes the hearing provisions of that Act The Hearing Procedures and Due Process As noted above the only complaint which petitioner can urge concerning the hearing procedures in this case is the objection that the special inquiry officer was subject to the supervision and control of officials in the Immigration Service charged with investigative and prosecuting functions Petitioner would have us hold that the presence of this relationship so strips the hearing of fairness and impartiality as to make the procedure violative of due process The contention is without substance when considered against the long standing practice in deportation proceedings judicially approved in numerous decisions in the federal courts and against the special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration matters The Claim of Prejudgment Our opinions in the Accardi cases stand for the proposition that the Attorney General cannot under present regulations dictate the actions of the Board of Immigration Appeals United States ex rel Accardi v Shaughnessy 347 U S 260 74 S Ct 499 98 L Ed 681 Shaughnessy v United States ex rel Accardi 349 U S 280 75 S Ct 746 Petitioner alleges that his case was prejudged within the meaning of these decisions because on the day of his arrest for deportation the Attorney General announced in a public statement 5 both in Washington and in New Orleans that petitioner was an undesirable citizen and had been guilty of many crimes and that the proceedings were specially designed to deport petitioner and that such publicity was bound to have great effect upon the special inquiry officer He alleged further that the Attorney General some time in 1952 prepared a list of 152 persons whom he desired to deport and that his name was included on this list Considering first the alleged list it is clear that petitioner has not made out a case of prejudgment He did not allege that either the inquiry officer or the Board of Immigration Appeals had seen the list had known of its existence or had been influenced in their decisions by the inclusion of petitioner s name thereon In argument before the Board petitioner stated through counsel that he had the feeling and it s a feeling that s based upon evidence which we will supply that the real basis for the denial of suspension here was the fact that Marcello was one of these hundred whom the Attorney General had named No evidence of this was forthcoming As to petitioner s charges concerning the Attorney General s list the record is completely barren Nor does petitioner fare better in seeking to base prejudgment on the unfavorable publicity accompanying his arrest He introduced newspaper clippings into evidence to show the adverse local publicity and alleged that this publicity must have had a great effect upon the special inquiry officer But the record indicates clearly that petitioner s case could not possibly have been prejudiced in the hearing before the inquiry officer On the question of petitioner s deportability the sole issue decided by him the hearing officer merely applied the statute to the undisputed facts Petitioner admitted that he was deportable under the Immigration Act of 1952 if the Act could constitutionally base deportation on his 1938 marihuana conviction And the hearing officer could be expected in any event to take the law as Congress enacted it In view of this Court s decisions on the ex post facto objection the only ground of attack he could do nothing else Petitioner waived the only issue on which prejudgment was possible when he declined to apply for discretionary relief at the proper time See 8 CFR 242 54 d The Board of Immigration Appeals considered the availability of discretionary relief but as to these officials there was not even an allegation by petitioner that they had known of the unfavorable publicity or had been influenced by it Indeed there is every indication that the Board had not prejudged the case since it considered the question of suspending deportation on the merits although not bound to do so in view of petitioner s waiver below The Board denied the requested relief giving reasons It is not for us in this proceeding to pass on the factors relied on by the Board in reaching its conclusion It is sufficient to observe that all had basis in the record and that none stemmed from any sort of dictation by the Attorney General Finally we note that even as to his claim relating to adverse publicity petitioner introduced no evidence other than the newspaper clippings Surely on this meager showing the district judge was warranted in finding as he did that the special inquiry officer the only official mentioned in petitioner s pleadings was not controlled in his decision by superiors in the Department of Justice The decision of the district judge cannot be set aside as clearly erroneous Accordingly we hold that under our Accardi decisions petitioner has failed to make out a case for a new hearing Ex Post Facto Petitioner s last objection stems from the fact that his conviction under the Marihuana Tax Act was not ground for deportation at the time he committed the offense and that he was not forewarned of all the consequences of his criminal conduct It is urged that we depart from our recent decisions holding that the prohibition of the ex post facto clause does not apply to deportation and strike down as unconstitutional the retroactive application of the new grounds for deportation in 241 a 11 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 We perceive no special reasons however for overturning our precedents on this matter and adhere to our decisions in Galvan v Press 347 U S 522 74 S Ct 737 98 L Ed 911 and Harisiades v Shaughnessy 342 U S 580 72 S Ct 512 96 L Ed 586 Affirmed Mr Justice HARLAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case TOP Mr Justice BLACK with whom Mr Justice FRANKFURTER joins dissenting Petitioner was lawfully brought to this country forty four years ago when he was eight months old and has resided here ever since He is married and has four children His wife and children are American citizens It is settled that he cannot be deported without being accorded a fair hearing in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 1 A fair hearing necessarily includes an impartial tribunal Petitioner claims that the circumstances here deprived him of that kind of tribunal The officer who conducted the hearings decided the case and made recommendations for deportation was connected with the Immigration and Naturalization Service This hearing officer was subject to the supervision direction and control of the Attorney General and his subordinate supervisory officers of the Immigration Service who perform investigative and prosecutorial functions Thus the hearing officer adjudicated the very case against petitioner which the hearing officer s superiors initiated and prosecuted Petitioner s argument is that requiring him to have his cause adjudicated by such a subordinate of the prosecutors deprives him of due process This due process challenge cannot be lightly dismissed but I find it unnecessary to rest my dissent on a determination of that question For Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act 2 has barred hearing officers from adjudicating cases under the circumstances here and I think that Act is applicable to this case Section 5 c of the Administrative Procedure Act forbids hearing officers covered by the Act to conduct hearings if they are responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any officer employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency In 1950 we held in Wong Yang Sung v McGrath 339 U S 33 70 S Ct 445 94 L Ed 616 that deportation proceedings must be conducted as required by 5 Congress however later in 1950 put a rider on an appropriation bill providing that Proceedings under law relating to the exclusion or expulsion of aliens shall hereafter be without regard to the provisions of sections 5 7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act 3 Were this express modification of the Procedure Act still in effect we would have to reach the constitutional question raised by petitioner But this appropriation rider was repealed in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act 4 The result of this repeal was to leave 5 c of the Administrative Procedure Act applicable to immigration cases unless as the Government contends other provisions of the 1952 Immigration Act made the Procedure Act inapplicable I think this contention of the Government should not be sustained Section 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly The 1950 appropriation rider was an express modification of the prior Procedure Act but unlike the Court I find no such express modification in the 1952 Immigration Act Indeed that Act s legislative sponsors disclaimed any purpose to bring about even an implied modification Both the Procedure Act and the 1952 Immigration Act were sponsored by Senator McCarran and Representative Walter Their original proposals which finally evolved into the 1952 Act did expressly provide that the Procedure Act should not control proceedings under the Immigration Act The provision was that Notwithstanding any other law including the Act of June 11 1946 the Administrative Procedure Act the proceedings so prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien who is in the United States 5 Hearings on these proposals brought strong protests from some organizations including the American Bar Association against the provision making the Administrative Procedure Act inapplicable to deportation proceedings 6 Afterwards the sponsors of the immigration measures introduced new bills which significantly omitted from that provision the words Notwithstanding any other law including the Act of June 11 1946 the Administrative Procedure Act Consequently when the bill finally passed there was no language which expressly superseded or modified the binding requirement of 5 c of the Administrative Procedure Act Senators who voted for the new version which became the 1952 Immigration Act were assured by the senatorial sponsor The Administrative Procedure Act is made applicable to the bill The Administrative Procedure Act prevails now The bill provides for administrative procedures and makes the Administrative Procedure Act applicable insofar as the administration of the bill is concerned 7 And House members voting for the 1952 Immigration Act were assured by its House sponsor Instead of destroying the Administrative Procedures Act we undo what the Congress did in a deficiency appropriation bill several years ago when it legislated to overturn a decision of the Supreme Court which ruled that the Administrative Procedures Act is applicable in deportation proceedings We undo that So here instead of our destroying the Administrative Procedures Act we actually see that it is reinstated in every instance 8 Reassuring the House again the next day Representative Walter said We have been very zealous to see that the philosophy underlying that act Administrative Procedure is embodied in this measure I am sure that if the gentleman will look at page 163 paragraph 46 he will find that the law as it was before the House adopted this amendment to an appropriation bill has been reinstated and that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Sung case will be the law of the land when this code is adopted 9 As previously pointed out the Sung case held that 5 c of the Administrative Procedure Act did apply to deportation cases Other statements in the discussions of the 1952 Act may look in a different direction from the statements just quoted But whatever was said no language in the 1952 Immigration Act expressly authorizes deportation cases to be heard contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act by hearing officers who are the dependent subordinates of the immigration agency s prosecutorial staff The idea of letting a prosecutor judge the very case he prosecutes or supervise and control the job of the judge before whom his case is presented is wholly inconsistent with our concepts of justice It was this principle on which Congress presumably acted in passing the Procedure Act Only the other day we had pointed out to us an instance in which the immigration authorities had relieved an immigration hearing officer from his duties because they believed that the hearing officer had failed adequately to present available derogatory information against an alien 10 It is hard to defend the fairness of a practice that subjects judges to the power and control of

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/349/302 (2012-11-09)
    Open archived version from archive

  • HENRY L. HERTZ, Collector, etc., v. GORDON O. WOODMAN et al. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
    Rep 313 In the last case cited the court said of this section that As the section of the Revised Statutes in question has only the force of a statute its provisions cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested either expressly or by necessary implication in a subsequent enactment But while this is true the provisions of 13 are to be treated as if incorporated in and as a part of subsequent enactments and therefore under the general principles of construction requiring if possible that effect be given to all the parts of a law the section must be enforced unless either by express declaration or necessary implication arising from the terms of the law as a whole it results that the legislative mind will be set at naught by giving effect to the provisions of 13 For the sake of brevity we do not stop to refer to the many cases from state courts of last resort dealing with the operation of general state statutes like unto 13 Rev Stat because we think the views just stated are obvious and their correctness is established by a prior decision of this court concerning that section United States v Reisinger 128 U S 398 32 L ed 480 9 Sup Ct Rep 99 This section is not alone applicable to penalties and forfeitures under penal statutes It extends as well to liabilities and a liability or obligation to pay a tax imposed under a repealed statute is not only within the letter but the spirit and purpose of the provision Therefore we must take that general saving clause into consideration as a part of the legislation involved in the determination of whether a liability had been incurred by the imposition of a tax prior to the act that destroyed the law under which it had been imposed The repealing act here involved includes a saving clause and if it necessarily or by clear implication conflicts with the general rule declared in 13 the latest expression of the legislative will must prevail In the case of Great Northern R Co v United States cited above the question was whether the saving clause in the Hepburn act was so plainly in conflict with the rule of construction found in 13 as to limit the actions or liabilities saved to those enumerated therein but the court held that as the later clause applied to remedies and procedure it was not by implication in conflict with the general provision of 13 which saved penalties forfeitures and liabilities 208 U S 466 467 The significance of 13 is therefore this That if prior to the repealing act the defendants in error were under any liability or obligation to pay the tax or duty imposed by 29 of the act of June 13 1898 that obligation or liability was not relieved by the mere repeal of that section nor as a consequence of the saving clause in the repealing act unless the special character of that clause by plain implication cuts down the scope and operation of the general rule in 13 In the light of these principles of interpretation we come then to the question as to whether at the date of the repeal of 29 of the act of June 13 1898 the legacies to the defendants in error were subject to any tax or duty under the repealed section which constituted a liability under 13 or to a tax or duty imposed under the saving clause of the repealing act The only section which imposes any tax upon inheritances is the 29th Any legacy or distributive share or gift in anticipation of death passing after the passage of the act is by the express terms of that section made subject to a duty or tax to be paid to the United States as follows etc Section 30 of the same act deals only with the return payment and procedure for the collection of the tax or duty aforesaid referring to the tax imposed by 29 Now what is the property right or thing which is made subject to the tax This has been most conclusively answered by Knowlton v Moore 178 U S 41 56 44 L ed 969 975 where the section in question is construed as laying a tax upon the transmission or the right to succeed to a legacy or distributive share or gift in contemplation of death passing after the act For reasons and upon grounds not necessary to be restated it has been also conclusively decided in Vanderbilt v Eidman 196 U S 480 49 L ed 563 25 Sup Ct Rep 331 that the tax or duty does not attach to legacies or distributive shares until the right of succession becomes an absolute right of immediate possession or enjoyment It was therefore held in the case cited that a legacy upon conditions which might never happen was not subject to the tax or duty prior to the time if ever when the right of possession or enjoyment should become absolute To repeat then The subject of the tax or duty exacted by 29 is the right of succession which passes by death to a vested beneficial right of possession or enjoyment of a legacy or distributive share Upon the facts certified the right of succession which passed by the death of the testator was an absolute right to the immediate possession and enjoyment a right neither postponed until the falling in of a life estate as in Mason v Sargent 104 U S 689 26 L ed 894 nor subject to contingencies as in Vanderbilt v Eidman supra No further event could make their title more certain nor their possession and enjoyment more secure The law then unrepealed and in full force operated to fasten at the moment this right of succession passed by death a liability for the tax imposed upon the passing of every such inheritance or right of succession The time for scheduling or listing was practically identical with the time for payment and the listing or scheduling was required to be done by the executor charged with payment but might be and was postponed for reasons of grace and of convenience That is almost universal under any taxing system The liability attaches at some time before the time for payment But the liability for the payment of the tax exacted under 29 of the act of June 13 1898 accrued or srose the moment the right of succession by death passed to the defendants in error and the occurrence of no other fact or event was essential to the imposition of a liability for the statutory tax upon the interest thus acquired Much has been urged because the tax was not due and payable when the repealing act took effect and the contention is that because not due and payable no tax had been theretofore imposed within the intent of the saving clause What we have already said answers this But let us see the very unreasonable result which would ensure if we are required to say that by tax or duty imposed under 29 Congress meant a tax or duty due and payable when the repealing act should go into effect No one questions but that one effect of this saving clause would be to save any such tax as was due and payable one year before July 1 1902 This being so it would be very unjust if the tax in the latter case is saved and the other remitted inasmuch as the thing made subject to the tax would in each case be the same namely the transmission of a beneficial right to the possession and enjoyment of a legacy or distributive share at the death of a testator or intestate In the one case the tax paid upon the right passing by death would be preserved In the other a tax upon a like inheritance would be remitted The only difference would be that in one case the time for payment had arrived while in the other it had not though in the latter case the ultimate obligation to pay was equally as certain and fixed as in the first case Now did Congress intend to make such an unjust distinction as would result from such an interpretation of the saving clause in question as shall make the time limit for payment the test as to whether one tax shall be preserved and the other remitted in a situation otherwise identical The saving clause does not in terms limit the right saved to a tax or duty which should be due and payable at the date of the repeal It is perhaps an obvious suggestion that if that had been the purpose of Congress it would have been easy to make that purpose clear But in place of saying in so many words that all taxes or duties which should be due and payable prior to the taking effect of the act should be subject to the provisions of 30 etc the Congress said that all taxes or duties imposed by 29 etc prior to the taking effect of this act should be subject to the provisions of 30 Now it is to be noticed that this 30 which is the remedial or procedure section is not one of the sections repealed The 29th section which alone imposes any tax is the one which is repealed The plain purpose of the saving clause was to preserve some liability which had been imposed under 29 which would otherwise be lost This it did by providing that all taxes imposed prior to the going into effect of the act should notwithstanding the repeal of the section which originated the tax be preserved and as to collection lien etc be subject to the unrepealed 30 It must also be borne in mind that this time limit for payment to one year after the death of the testator came into the 30th section only by the amendment of March 2 1901 Up to the time of that amendment the only provision as to time was that still found in the later parts of the same section namely that before payment and distribution to the legatees the executor administrator or trustee shall pay to the collector the amount of the duty or tax assessed upon such legacy or distributive share and shall also make and render to the collector a schedule list or statement in duplicate of the amount of such legacy or distributive share together with the amount of duty which has accrued or shall accrue thereon verified etc The same original section also provided that in case of neglect to so pay or deliver the statement required within the time hereinbefore provided certain penalties should be incurred and that the collector should make out schedules etc This reference to the time hereinbefore provided is in the original section and must therefore refer to a time before payment and distribution to the legatees and distributees It would seem to follow that the purpose and effect of the amendment making such tax due and payable in one year after the death of the testator was to advance the time of payment so as to require payment within one year if there should be longer delay in paying legacies and distributive shares leaving in full force the requirement that the tax should be paid before the payment of legacies and distributive shares if such payment and distribution whould be made in less than one year We have not passed over the fact that this time limit in terms applies only to the tax due under wills and to the uncertainty as to the time for the apyment of the tax upon distributive shares It however seems quite obvious that that time limit was intended to apply to shares in intestate estates as well as to legacies from testators and that the omission may be supplied by necessary implication In has been suggested that the lien given by 30 only attaches when the tax is due and payable The lien was in the section before the amendment and in view of its purpose would attach with the obligation or liability for the tax There is no reason which would justify the assumption that the lien only attached when the day of payment might arrive a date most indefinite before the insertion of the time limit by the amendment of 1902 But it has been urged that any conclusion which saves a tax from the effect of a repealing act which was not actually due and payable is in conflict with Mason v Sargent supra That case arose under the inheritance tax law of 1864 13 Stat at L 223 chap 173 The plaintiff s testator died while the law was in force it having been repealed October 1 1870 The legacy to the plaintiff which was in that case held to have been illegally taxed was one payable after the death of the widow of the testator which did not occur until 1872 and after the repeal of the law under which the tax was claimed But that case is distinguishable from this in more than one particular The legacy sought to be taxed did not vest in possession and enjoyment before the repeal of the act under which it was supposed to be taxable If therefore no taxable succession occurred during the existence of the inheritance tax law of 1864 the right to the tax would fail under the very test which this court in Vanderbilt v Eidman made the test of whether a tax had been imposed during the operation of the act of June 13 1898 and the very test which is applied in the present case The precise question here involved and upon which this case must turn namely whether a tax is not at once imposed by succeeding to an immediate right of possession and enjoyment during the operation of the act of June 13 1898 in such sense as to be within the intent of the saving clause in the act which repealed that act was not and could not have been involved in the case cited The terms both of the act of 1864 as amended in 1866 14 Stat at L 98 chap 184 and of the act which repealed that act and of the saving clause in the repealing act are in some important aspects to be differentiated from the acts here involved It is enough however to say of that case that no taxable succession having occurred before the repeal of the act there was nothing to save by the saving clause in the repealing act In the present case it is equally as clear that if no taxable succession actually vested prior to the repeal of the taxing act no tax would be saved If however there did occur such an absolute right to the possession and enjoyment of the legacies to the present defendants in error as made it subject at once to the imposition of a tax under the law in operation when such succession occurred a very different question must be decided from any decided in Mason v Sargent The conclusion we reach is that upon the passing by death of a vested right to the immediate possession or enjoyment of a legacy or distributive share there was imposed the tax or duty exacted upon every such right of succession which was saved by the saving clause of the repealing act The question certified must be answered in the negative TOP Mr Justice McKenna dissenting I am unable to agree to the judgment of the court I regret that time does not serve to give adequate expression to my views or to consider opposing ones Some of the elements of dissent I can only hastily give The question of the interpretation of a statute is however seldom in broad compass The purpose is to get at the meaning of the words and fortunately there are wellknown rules to assist the process The first of these is the motive of the law Whatever construction advances that carries a presumption of truth There must be a strict or liberal construction according to the purpose of the law the former if it imposes burdens the latter if it relieves from them The contentions of the government it seems to me reverse this order Their consequences seem to me to be The law is a taxing one is concededly of doubtful meaning it must nevertheless be construed against the taxpayer It was intended to relieve from burdens its ambiguities must be resolved to retain them These contradictions between intention and result are intensified if we consider the general purpose of the law proclaimed at the time of its enactment It was intended as a repeal of war revenue taxation In other words to take from a time of peace burdens laid in time of war A worthy purpose I submit and based on wisest considerations of governmental policy and not to be defeated or impaired in any of its details by resolving the uncertainties of language against it There was emphatic and illustrative unanimity in the Committee of Ways and Means of the House of Representatives that reported and recommended the law There was a difference of opinion in the committee as to the extent of the reduction which should be made resulting from a difference in other views of its members but there was no difference as to the necessity of a reduction of revenue The majority of the committee recommended a reduction of 73 000 000 the minority was of opinion it should be 123 000 000 In the reduction there was a special item of legacies The figures need no comment They display the purpose of Congress Words however were added to emphasize it Sound business judgment it was said

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/218/205 (2012-11-09)
    Open archived version from archive

  • | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
    Bonds 349 U S 302 310 1955 Exemptions from the terms of the Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement that modifications must be express But u nless we are to require the Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the Act we must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes the provisions of that Act citation omitted Great Northern R Co v United States 208 U S 452 465 1908 We need not decide the effect of express reference provisions such as 407 b to resolve this case Because the Debt Collection Improvement Act clearly makes Social Security benefits subject to offset it provides exactly the sort of express reference that the Social Security Act says is necessary to supersede the anti attachment provision It is clear that the Higher Education Technical Amendments remove the 10 year limit that would otherwise bar offsetting petitioner s Social Security benefits to pay off his student loan debt Petitioner argues that Congress could not have intended in 1991 to repeal the Debt Collection Act s statute of limitations as to offsets against Social Security benefits since debt collection by Social Security offset was not authorized until five years later Therefore petitioner continues the Higher Education Technical Amendments abrogation of time limits in 1991 only applies to then valid means of debt collection We disagree The fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning Union Bank v Wolas 502 U S 151 158 1991 Petitioner points out that the Higher Education Technical Amendments unlike the Debt Collection Improvement Act do not explicitly mention 407 But 407 b only requires an express reference to authorize attachment in the first place which the Debt Collection Improvement Act has already provided III Nor does the Debt Collection Improvement Act s 1996 recodification of the Debt Collection Act help petitioner The Debt Collection Improvement Act in addition to adding offset authority against Social Security benefits retained the Debt Collection Act s general 10 year bar on offset authority But the mere retention of this previously enacted time bar does not make the time bar apply in all contexts a result that would extend far beyond Social Security benefits since it would imply that the Higher Education Technical Amendments abrogation of time limits was now a dead letter as to any kind of administrative offset Rather the Higher Education Technical Amendments retain their effect as a limited exception to the Debt Collection Act time bar in the student loan context Finally we decline to read any meaning into the failed 2004 effort to amend the Debt Collection Act to explicitly authorize offset of debts over 10 years old See H R 5025 108th Cong 2d Sess 642 Sept 8 2004 S 2806 108th Cong 2d Sess 642 Sept 15 2004 F ailed legislative proposals are a particularly

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/546/142 (2012-11-09)
    Open archived version from archive

  • MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD., et al., Petitioners, v. Lawrence EPSTEIN et al. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
    U S 75 80 104 S Ct 892 896 79 L Ed 2d 56 1984 In the absence of federal law modifying the operation of 1738 the preclusive effect in federal court of a state court judgment is determined by state law We observed in Marrese that the inquiry into state law would not always yield a direct answer Usually a state court will not have occasion to address the specific question whether a state judgment has issue or claim preclusive effect in a later action that can be brought only in federal court 470 U S at 381 382 105 S Ct at 1332 Where a judicially approved settlement is under consideration a federal court may consequently find guidance from general state law on the preclusive force of settlement judgments See e g id at 382 383 n 2 105 S Ct at 1333 n 2 observing in connection with Nash that North Carolina law gives preclusive effect to consent judgments Here in addition to providing rules regarding the preclusive force of class action settlement judgments in subsequent suits in state court the Delaware courts have also spoken to the particular effect of such judgments in federal court Delaware has traditionally treated the impact of settlement judgments on subsequent litigation in state court as a question of claim preclusion Early cases suggested that Delaware courts would not afford claim preclusive effect to a settlement releasing claims that could not have been presented in the trial court See Ezzes v Ackerman 234 A 2d 444 445 446 Del 1967 A judgment entered either after trial on the merits or upon an approved settlement is res judicata and bars subsequent suit on the same claim The defense of res judicata is available if the pleadings framing the issues in the first action would have permitted the raising of the issue sought to be raised in the second action and if the facts were known or could have been known to the plaintiff in the second action at the time of the first action As the Court of Chancery has perceived however the Ezzes inquiry was modified in regard to class actions In re Union Square Associates Securities Litigation C A No 11028 1993 WL 220528 3 June 16 1993 by the Delaware Supreme Court s decision in Nottingham Partners v Dana 564 A 2d 1089 1989 In Nottingham a class action the Delaware Supreme Court approved a settlement that released claims then pending in federal court In approving that settlement the Nottingham Court appears to have eliminated the Ezzes requirement that the claims could have been raised in the suit that produced the settlement at least with respect to class actions In order to achieve a comprehensive settlement that would prevent relitigation of settled questions at the core of a class action a court may permit the release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action even though the claim was not presented and might not have been presentable in the class action 564 A 2d at 1106 quoting TBK Partners Ltd v Western Union Corp 675 F 2d 456 460 C A 2 1982 See Union Square C A No 11028 1993 WL 220528 3 relying directly on Nottingham to hold that a Delaware court judgment settling a class action was res judicata and barred arbitration of duplicative claims that could not have been brought in the first suit These cases indicate that even if as here a claim could not have been raised in the court that rendered the settlement judgment in a class action a Delaware court would still find that the judgment bars subsequent pursuit of the claim The Delaware Supreme Court has further manifested its understanding that when the Court of Chancery approves a global release of claims its settlement judgment should preclude on going or future federal court litigation of any released claims In Nottingham the Court stated that the validity of executing a general release in conjunction with the termination of litigation has long been recognized by the Delaware courts More specifically the Court of Chancery has a history of approving settlements that have implicitly or explicitly included a general release which would also release federal claims 564 A 2d at 1105 citation omitted Though the Delaware Supreme Court correctly recognized in Nottingham that it lacked actual authority to order the dismissal of any case pending in federal court it asserted that state court approval of the settlement would have the collateral effect of preventing class members from prosecuting their claims in federal court Perhaps the clearest statement of the Delaware Chancery Court s view on this matter was articulated in the suit preceding this one When a state court settlement of a class action releases all claims which arise out of the challenged transaction and is determined to be fair and to have met all due process requirements the class members are bound by the release or the doctrine of issue preclusion Class members cannot subsequently relitigate the claims barred by the settlement in a federal court In re MCA Inc Shareholders Litigation 598 A 2d 687 691 1991 4 We are aware of no Delaware case that suggests otherwise Given these statements of Delaware law we think that a Delaware court would afford preclusive effect to the settlement judgment in this case notwithstanding the fact that respondents could not have pressed their Exchange Act claims in the Court of Chancery The claims are clearly within the scope of the release in the judgment since the judgment specifically refers to this lawsuit As required by Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23 see Prezant v De Angelis 636 A 2d 915 920 1994 the Court of Chancery found and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that the settlement was fair reasonable and adequate and in the best interests of the Settlement class and that notice to the class was in full compliance with the requirements of due process In re MCA Inc Shareholders Litigation C A No 11740 Feb 22 1993 reprinted in App to Pet for Cert 73a 74a Cf Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts 472 U S 797 812 105 S Ct 2965 2974 86 L Ed 2d 628 1985 due process for class action plaintiffs requires notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation The Court of Chancery further determined that the plaintiffs as representatives of the Settlement Class have fairly and adequately protected the interests of the Settlement Class In re MCA Inc Shareholders Litigation supra reprinted in App to Pet for Cert 73a Cf Phillips Petroleum Co supra at 812 105 S Ct at 2974 due process requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members 5 Under Delaware Rule 23 as under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 all members of the class whether of a plaintiff or a defendant class are bound by the judgment entered in the action unless in a Rule 23 b 3 action they make a timely election for exclusion 2 H Newberg Class Actions 2755 p 1224 1977 See also Cooper v Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 467 U S 867 874 104 S Ct 2794 2798 81 L Ed 2d 718 1984 There is of course no dispute that under elementary principles of prior adjudication a judgment in a properly entertained class action is binding on class members in any subsequent litigation Respondents do not deny that as shareholders of MCA s common stock they were part of the plaintiff class and that they never opted out they are bound then by the judgment 6 2 Because it appears that the settlement judgment would be res judicata under Delaware law we proceed to the second step of the Marrese analysis and ask whether 27 of the Exchange Act which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts for suits arising under the Act partially repealed 1738 Section 27 contains no express language regarding its relationship with 1738 or the preclusive effect of related state court proceedings Thus any modification of 1738 by 27 must be implied In deciding whether 27 impliedly created an exception to 1738 the general question is whether the concerns underlying a particular grant of exclusive jurisdiction justify a finding of an implied partial repeal of 1738 Marrese 470 U S at 386 105 S Ct at 1334 Resolution of this question will depend on the particular federal statute as well as the nature of the claim or issue involved in the subsequent federal action The primary consideration must be the intent of Congress Ibid As an historical matter we have seldom if ever held that a federal statute impliedly repealed 1738 See Parsons Steel Inc v First Alabama Bank 474 U S 518 523 524 106 S Ct 768 771 772 88 L Ed 2d 877 1986 Anti Injunction Act does not limit 1738 Migra v Warren City School Dist Bd of Ed 465 U S 75 83 85 104 S Ct 892 897 898 79 L Ed 2d 56 1984 1983 does not limit claim preclusion under 1738 Kremer v Chemical Constr Corp 456 U S 461 468 476 102 S Ct 1883 1890 1895 72 L Ed 2d 262 1982 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not limit 1738 Allen v McCurry 449 U S 90 96 105 101 S Ct 411 415 421 66 L Ed 2d 308 1980 1983 does not limit issue preclusion under 1738 But cf Brown v Felsen 442 U S 127 138 139 99 S Ct 2205 2212 2213 60 L Ed 2d 767 1979 declining to give claim preclusive effect to prior state court debt collection proceeding in federal bankruptcy suit without discussing 1738 state law or implied repeals The rarity with which we have discovered implied repeals is due to the relatively stringent standard for such findings namely that there be an irreconcilable conflict between the two federal statutes at issue Kremer v Chemical Constr Corp supra at 468 102 S Ct at 1890 quoting Radzanower v Touche Ross Co 426 U S 148 154 96 S Ct 1989 1993 48 L Ed 2d 540 1976 Section 27 provides that the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder 15 U S C 78aa There is no suggestion in 27 that Congress meant for plaintiffs with Exchange Act claims to have more than one day in court to challenge the legality of a securities transaction Though the statute plainly mandates that suits alleging violations of the Exchange Act may be maintained only in federal court nothing in the language of 27 remotely expresses any congressional intent to contravene the common law rules of preclusion or to repeal the express statutory requirements of 28 U S C 1738 Allen v McCurry supra at 97 98 101 S Ct at 416 Nor does 27 evince any intent to prevent litigants in state court whether sui ng as individuals or as part of a class from voluntarily releasing Exchange Act claims in judicially approved settlements While 27 prohibits state courts from adjudicating claims arising under the Exchange Act it does not prohibit state courts from approving the release of Exchange Act claims in the settlement of suits over which they have properly exercised jurisdiction i e suits arising under state law or under federal law for which there is concurrent jurisdiction In this case for example the Delaware action was not brought to enforce any rights or obligations under the Act The Delaware court asserted judicial power over a complaint asserting purely state law causes of action 7 and after the parties agreed to settle certified the class and approved the settlement pursuant to the requirements of Delaware Rule of Chancery 23 and the Due Process Clause Thus the Delaware court never trespassed upon the exclusive territory of the federal courts but merely approved the settlement of a common law suit pursuant to state and nonexclusive federal law See Abramson v Pennwood Investment Corp 392 F 2d 759 762 C A 2 1968 Although the state court could not adjudicate the federal claim it was within its powers over the corporation and the parties to approve the release of that claim as a condition of settlement of the state action While it is true that the state court assessed the general worth of the federal claims in determining the fairness of the settlement such assessment does not amount to a judgment on the merits of the claims See TBK Partners Ltd v Western Union Corp 675 F 2d 456 461 C A 2 1982 Approval of a settlement does not call for findings of fact regarding the claims to be compromised The court is concerned only with the likelihood of success or failure the actual merits of the controversy are not to be determined quoting Haudek The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders Actions Part II The Settlement 23 Sw L J 765 809 1969 footnotes omitted The Delaware court never purported to resolve the merits of the Exchange Act claims in the course of appraising the settlement indeed it expressly disavowed that purpose See In re MCA Inc Shareholders Litigation C A No 11740 1993 WL 43024 Feb 16 1993 reprinted in App to Pet for Cert 68a In determining whether a settlement should be approved a court should not try the merits of the underlying claims This principle would seem to be especially appropriate where the underlying claims like the federal claims here are outside the jurisdiction of this Court citation omitted The legislative history of the Exchange Act elucidates no specific purpose on the part of Congress in enacting 27 See Murphy v Gallagher 761 F 2d 878 885 C A 2 1985 noting that the legislative history of the Exchange Act provides no readily apparent explanation for the provision of exclusive jurisdiction in 27 citing 2 3 L Loss Securities Regulation 997 2005 2d ed 1961 We may presume however that Congress intended 27 to serve at least the general purposes underlying most grants of exclusive jurisdiction to achieve greater uniformity of construction and more effective and expert application of that law Murphy v Gallagher supra at 885 When a state court upholds a settlement that releases claims under the Exchange Act it threatens neither of these policies There is no danger that state court judges who are not fully expert in federal securities law will say definitively what the Exchange Act means and enforce legal liabilities and duties thereunder And the uniform construction of the Act is unaffected by a state court s approv al of a proposed settlement because the state court does not adjudicate the Exchange Act claims but only evaluates the overall fairness of the settlement generally by applying its own business judgment to the facts of the case See e g Polk v Good 507 A 2d 531 535 Del 1986 Furthermore other provisions of the Exchange Act suggest that Congress did not intend to create an exception to 1738 for suits alleging violations of the Act Congress plainly contemplated the possibility of dual litigation in state and federal courts relating to securities transactions See 15 U S C 78bb a preserving all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity And all that Congress chose to say about the consequences of such litigation is that plaintiffs ought not obtain double recovery See ibid Congress said nothing to modify the background rule that where a state court judgment precedes that of a federal court the federal court must give full faith and credit to the state court judgment See Murphy v Gallagher supra at 884 Finally precedent supports the conclusion that the concerns underlying the grant of exclusive jurisdiction in 27 are not undermined by state court approval of settlements releasing Exchange Act claims We have held that state court proceedings may in various ways subsequently affect the litigation of exclusively federal claims without running afoul of the federal jurisdictional grant in question In Becher v Contoure Laboratories Inc 279 U S 388 49 S Ct 356 73 L Ed 752 1929 cited in Marrese 470 U S at 381 105 S Ct at 1332 we held that state court findings of fact were issue preclusive in federal patent suits We did so with full recognition that the logical conclusion from the establishing of the state law claim is that Becher s patent is void 279 U S at 391 49 S Ct at 357 Becher reasoned that although decrees validating or invalidating patents belong to the Courts of the United States that does not give sacrosanctity to facts that may be conclusive upon the question in issue Ibid Similarly while binding legal determinations of rights and liabilities under the Exchange Act are for federal courts only there is nothing sacred about the approval of settlements of suits arising under state law even where the parties agree to release exclusively federal claims See also Brown v Felsen 442 U S at 139 n 10 99 S Ct at 2213 n 10 noting that if in the course of adjudicating a state law question a state court should determine factual issues using standards identical to those of 17 then collateral estoppel in the absence of countervailing statutory policy would bar relitigation of those issues in the bankruptcy court Pratt v Paris Gaslight Coke Co 168 U S 255 258 18 S Ct 62 63 42 L Ed 458 1897 when a state court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the complaint the state court may decide the validity of a patent when that issue is raised as a defense We have also held that Exchange Act claims may be resolved by arbitration rather than litigation in federal court In Shearson American Express Inc v McMahon 482 U S 220 107 S Ct 2332 96 L Ed 2d 185 1987 we found that parties to an arbitration agreement could waive the right to have their Exchange Act claims tried in federal court and agree to arbitrate the claims Id at 227 228 107 S Ct at 2337 2338 It follows that state court litigants ought also to be able to waive or release the right to litigate Exchange Act claims in a federal forum as part of a settlement agreement As Shearson American Express Inc demonstrates a statute conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction for a certain class of claims does not necessarily require resolution of those claims in a federal court Taken together these cases stand for the general proposition that even when exclusively federal claims are at stake there is no universa l right to litigate a federal claim in a federal district court Allen v McCurry 449 U S at 105 101 S Ct at 420 If class action plaintiffs wish to preserve absolutely their right to litigate exclusively federal claims in federal court they should either opt out of the settlement class or object to the release of any exclusively federal claims In fact some of the plaintiffs in the Delaware class action requested exclusion from the settlement class They are now proceeding in federal court with their federal claims unimpeded by the Delaware judgment In the end 27 and 1738 do not pose an either or proposition Connecticut Nat Bank v Germain 503 U S 249 253 112 S Ct 1146 1149 117 L Ed 2d 391 1992 They can be reconciled by reading 1738 to mandate full faith and credit of state court judgments incorporating global settlements provided the rendering court had jurisdiction over the underlying suit itself and by reading 27 to prohibit state courts from exercising jurisdiction over suits arising under the Exchange Act Cf C Wright A Miller E Cooper Federal Practice and Procedure 4470 pp 688 689 1981 Settlement of state court litigation has been held to defeat a subsequent federal action if the settlement was intended to apply to claims in exclusive federal jurisdiction as well as other claims These rulings are surely correct Congress intent to provide an exclusive federal forum for adjudication of suits to enforce the Exchange Act is clear enough But we can find no suggestion in 27 that Congress meant to override the principles of comity and repose embodied in 1738 Kremer v Chemical Constr Corp 456 U S at 463 102 S Ct at 1888 by allowing plaintiffs with Exchange Act claims to release those claims in state court and then litigate them in federal court We conclude that the Delaware courts would give the settlement judgment preclusive effect in a subsequent proceeding and further that 27 did not effect a partial repeal of 1738 C The Court of Appeals did not engage in any analysis of Delaware law pursuant to 1738 Rather the Court of Appeals declined to apply 1738 on the ground that where the rendering forum lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties full faith and credit is not required 50 F 3d at 661 666 See Underwriters Nat Assurance Co v North Carolina Life Accident Health Ins Guaranty Assn 455 U S 691 704 705 102 S Ct 1357 1366 71 L Ed 2d 558 1982 A judgment of a court in one State is conclusive upon the merits in a court in another State only if the court in the first State had power to pass on the merits had jurisdiction that is to render the judgment quoting Durfee v Duke 375 U S 106 110 84 S Ct 242 244 11 L Ed 2d 186 1963 The Court of Appeals decided that the subject matter jurisdiction exception to full faith and credit applies to this case because the Delaware court acted outside the bounds of its own jurisdiction in approving the settlement since the settlement released exclusively federal claims See 50 F 3d at 661 662 and n 25 As explained above the state court in this case clearly possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter of the underlying suit and over the defendants Only if this were not so for instance if the complaint alleged violations of the Exchange Act and the Delaware court rendered a judgment on the merits of those claims would the exception to 1738 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction apply Where as here the rendering court in fact had subject matter jurisdiction the subject matter jurisdiction exception to full faith and credit is simply inapposite In such a case the relevance of a federal statute that provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction is not to the state court s possession of jurisdiction per se but to the existence of a partial repeal of 1738 8 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion It is so ordered TOP Justice STEVENS concurring in part and dissenting in part While I join Parts I II A and II C of the Court s opinion and while I also agree with the Court s reasons for concluding that 27 of the Exchange Act does not create an implied partial repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Act I join neither Part II B nor the Court s judgment because I agree with Justice GINSBURG that the question of Delaware law should be addressed by the Court of Appeals in the first instance and that the Ninth Circuit remains free to consider whether Delaware courts fully and fairly litigated the adequacy of class representation TOP Justice GINSBURG with whom Justice STEVENS joins and with whom Justice SOUTER joins as to Part II B concurring in part and dissenting in part I join the Court s judgment to the extent that it remands the case to the Ninth Circuit I agree that a remand is in order because the Court of Appeals did not attend to this Court s reading of 28 U S C 1738 in a controlling decision Kremer v Chemical Constr Corp 456 U S 461 102 S Ct 1883 72 L Ed 2d 262 1982 But I would not endeavor as the Court does to speak the first word on the content of Delaware preclusion law Instead I would follow our standard practice of remitting that issue for decision in the first instance by the lower federal courts See e g Marrese v American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons 470 U S 373 387 105 S Ct 1327 1335 84 L Ed 2d 274 1985 I write separately to emphasize a point key to the application of 1738 A state court judgment generally is not entitled to full faith and credit unless it satisfies the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment s Due Process Clause See Kremer 456 U S at 482 483 102 S Ct at 1898 1899 In the class action setting adequate representation is among the due process ingredients that must be supplied if the judgment is to bind absent class members See Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts 472 U S 797 808 812 105 S Ct 2965 2972 2974 86 L Ed 2d 628 1985 Prezant v De Angelis 636 A 2d 915 923 924 Del 1994 Suitors in this action called the Epstein plaintiffs in this opinion respondents here argued before the Ninth Circuit and again before this Court that they cannot be bound by the Delaware settlement because they were not adequately represented by the Delaware class representatives They contend that the Delaware representatives willingness to release federal securities claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts for a meager return to the class members but a solid fee to the Delaware class attorneys disserved the interests of the class particularly the absentees The inadequacy of representation was apparent the Epstein plaintiffs maintained for at the time of the settlement the federal claims were sub judice in the proper forum for those claims the federal judiciary Although the Ninth Circuit decided the case without reaching the due process check on the full faith and credit obligation that inquiry remains open for consideration on remand See ante at n 5 due process was not the basis for the decision below so the Court need not address it Matsushita s acquisition of MCA prompted litigation in state and federal courts A brief account of that litigation will facilitate comprehension of the Epstein plaintiffs position On September 26 1990 in response to reports in the financial press that Matsushita was negotiating to buy MCA a suit was filed in the Court of Chancery of Delaware a purported class action on behalf of the stockholders of MCA Naming MCA and its directors but not Matsushita as defendants the complaint invoked state law only It alleged that MCA s directors had failed to carry out a market check to maximize shareholder value upon a change in corporate control a check required by Revlon Inc v MacAndrews Forbes Holdings Inc 506 A 2d 173 182 Del 1986 For this alleged breach of fiduciary duty the complaint sought inter alia an injunction against Matsushita s proposed acquisition of MCA Matsushita announced its tender offer on November 26 1990 It offered holders of MCA common stock 71 per share if they tendered their shares before December 29 1990 The owners of 91 of MCA s common stock tendered their shares and on January 3 1991 for a price of 6 1 billion Matsushita acquired MCA On December 3 1990 a few days after the required SEC filings disclosed the terms of the tender offer several MCA shareholders filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California 1 Based solely on federal law their complaints alleged that Matsushita first named defendant violated SEC Rules 14d 10 17 CFR 240 14d 10 1994 and 10b 13 17 CFR 240 10b 13 1994 by offering preferential treatment in the tender offer to MCA principals Lew Wasserman and Sidney Sheinberg As stated in the complaint the public tender offer included a special tax driven stock swap arrangement for Wasserman then MCA s chairman and chief executive officer and a 21 million bonus for Sheinberg then MCA s chief operating officer and owner of 1 170 000 shares of MCA common stock These arrangements allegedly violated inter alia the SEC s all holder best price rule Rule 14d 10 which requires bidders to treat all shareholders on equal terms The claims of federal securities law violations fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court See 15 U S C 78aa The Epstein plaintiffs also sought class certification to represent all MCA shareholders at the time of the tender offer Two days later counsel in the Delaware action advised MCA s counsel that the Delaware plaintiffs intended to amend their complaint to include additional claims against MCA and its directors and to add Matsushita as a defendant The additional claims alleged that MCA wasted corporate assets by increasing the corporation s exposure to liability for violation of Rules 10b 13 and 14d 10 that MCA failed to make full disclosure of the benefits MCA insiders would receive from the takeover and that directors Wasserman and Sheinberg breached their fiduciary duties by negotiating preferential deals with Matsushita Matsushita the amended complaint alleged had conspired with and aided and abetted MCA directors in violation of Delaware law Within days the Delaware parties agreed to a settlement and on December 17 1990 submitted their proposal to the Delaware Vice Chancellor The agreement provided for a modification of a poison pill in the corporate charter of an MCA subsidiary 2 and for a fees payment of 1 million to the class counsel The settlement agreement required the release of all claims state and federal arising out of the tender offer The Vice Chancellor rejected the settlement agreement on April 22 1991 for two reasons the absence of any monetary benefit to the class members and the potential value of the federal claims that the agreement proposed to release The generous payment of 1 million in counsel fees the Vice Chancellor observed conferred no benefit on the members of the Class In re MCA Inc Shareholders Litigation 598 A 2d 687 695 Del Ch 1991 And the value of the revised poison pill to the class the Vice Chancellor said was illusionary apparently proposed merely to justify a settlement which offers no real monetary benefit to the Class Id at 696 The Vice Chancellor described the state law claims as at best extremely weak and therefore of little or no value Id at 694 The only claims which have any substantial merit he said are the claims in the California federal suit that were not asserted in this Delaware action Id at 696 After the rejection of the settlement the Delaware lawsuit lay dormant for more than a year The federal litigation proceeded In various rulings the District Court denied the federal plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment denied the Epstein plaintiffs motion for class certification and granted Matsushita s motion for summary judgment dismissing the claims On April 15 1992 the District Court entered its final judgment which the Epstein plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit On October 22 1992 after the federal plaintiffs had filed their notice of appeal the Delaware parties reached a second settlement agreement Matsushita agreed to create a 2 million settlement fund that would afford shareholders 2 to 3 cents per share before payment of fees and costs The Delaware class counsel requested 691 000 in fees In return for this relief the Delaware plaintiffs agreed to release all claims rights and causes of action state or federal including but not limited to claims arising under the federal securities laws and any rules or regulations promulgated thereunder or otherwise in connection with or that arise now or hereafter out of the tender offer including without limitation the claims asserted in the California Federal Actions App 187 188 Unlike the first settlement proposal the second agreement included an opt out provision This time the Vice Chancellor approved the settlement He stated it is in the best interests of the class to settle this litigation and the terms of the settlement are fair and reasonable although the value of the benefit to the class is meager In re MCA Inc Shareholders Litigation C A No 11740 1993 WL 43024 1 Del Ch Feb 16 1993 He found the class members recovery of 2 to 3 cents per share adequate if only barely so to support the proposed settlement Id at 4 The federal claims he reasoned having been dismissed by the District Court now have minimal economic value Ibid And he gave weight to the presence in the second settlement agreement of an opt out provision Ibid Addressing the objectors contention that the proposed settlement was collusive the Vice Chancellor recalled that the settling parties had previously proposed a patently inadequate settlement and he agreed that suspicions abound Id at 5 Nevertheless he noted the objectors have offered no evide nce of any collusion so he declined to reject the settlement on that ground Ibid Reducing the counsel fees from the requested 691 000 to 250 000 the Vice Chancellor offered this observation The defendants willingness to create the settlement fund seems likely to have been motivated as much by their concern as to their potential liability under the federal claims as by their concern for liability under the state law claims which this Court characterized as extremely weak Id at 6 In a brief order the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Court of Chancery In re MCA Inc Shareholders Litigation C A No 126 1993 1993 WL 385041 1 Sept 21 1993 judgt order reported at 633 A 2d 370 Before the Ninth Circuit Matsushita argued that the Delaware class action settlement barred litigation of the federal claims raised in the Epstein action The Ninth Circuit disagreed Relying on federal circuit court decisions 3 the Court of Appeals held that state courts lack plenary power to approve settlements that effectively extinguish exclusively federal claims Only if federal and state claims rest on the identical factual predicate the Ninth Circuit concluded could a state court settlement subsume an exclusively federal claim It was not enough in the Ninth Circuit s view that the discrete federal and state claims stem from the same transaction the test Matsushita urged 50 F 3d at 661 665 The federal securities claims did not turn on the same operative facts as the state claims pleaded in Delaware the Ninth Circuit found accordingly the federal claims could not have been extinguished by the issue preclusive effect of an adjudication of the state claims This analysis led the Ninth Circuit to declare that the Delaware decree exceeded the jurisdiction of the state court and therefore is not entitled to full faith and credit Id at 666 On the merits the Ninth Circuit held first that a private right of action could be maintained to redress Rule 14d 10 violations Id at 652 The court next held that Matsushita violated Rule 14d 10 by paying Wasserman consideration not offered to other shareholders id at 657 reversing the District Court s disposition of this matter the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on liability and remanded for a determination of damages ibid Regarding plaintiffs claim that the 21 million payment to Sheinberg violated Rule 14d 10 the Ninth Circuit vacated the summary judgment for Matsushita and remanded for a determination whether the payment was in fact made to encourage Sheinberg to tender his shares Id at 659 II Section 1738 s full faith and credit instruction as

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/516/367 (2012-11-09)
    Open archived version from archive

  • POSADAS, Collector of Internal Revenue, v. NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
    the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 not being in conflict with any provision of the Organic Act of 1916 was continued in full force and effect September 7 1916 nine days after the passage of the new Organic Act the act to amend the Federal Reserve Act supra was passed It first is to be observed in respect of this amending act that it does not purport to enact a substitute for the Federal Reserve Act or to rpeal and reenact any portion but only to amend certain specific sections thereof The old act contains thirty sections The Act of September 7 1916 amends sections 11 13 subsection e of section 14 the second paragraph of section 16 sections 24 and 25 of Federal Reserve Act and section 5202 of the Revised Statutes The introductory words as to section 25 are That section twenty five be and is hereby amended to read as follows 39 Stat 755 The original section is then copied the only change or addition so far as the question here is concerned being the insertion of the words or insular possessions after the word dependencies No reason appears from anything called to our attention and we are not ourselves aware of any reason for the addition of these words since the comprehensive term dependencies would seem to include all insular possessions which we then had But in any event the Philippine Islands constituted a dependency for they were not possessions merely but possession held by right of cession from Spain and over which the United States undoubtedly had supreme power of legislation and government See United States v The Nancy Fed Cas No 15 854 3 Wash C C 281 286 at seq Compare 34 Op Attys Gen 287 291 The only substantial change made in the old section 25 is the addition of a provision authorizing a national banking association to invest in the stock of other banks and corporations chartered or incorporated under the laws of the United States or of any state engaged in international or foreign banking or banking in dependencies or insular possessions of the United States and it is fairly plain that this addition constituted the sole reason for amending the section The amending act just described contains no words of repeal and if it effected a repeal of section 25 of the 1913 act it did so by implication only The cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored Where there are two acts upon the same subject effect should be given to both if possible There are two well settled categories of repeals by implication 1 Where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one and 2 if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act But in either case the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest otherwise at least as a general thing the later act is to be construed as a continuation of and not a substitute for the first act and will continue to speak so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment The law on the subject as we have just stated it finds abundant support in the decisions of this court as well as in those of lower federal and state courts It will be enough to direct attention to a few of these decisions out of a very large number In United States v Tynen 11 Wall 88 92 20 L Ed 153 Mr Justice Field speaking for the court after stating the general rule said that if two acts are repugnant in any of their provisions the latter act without any repealing clause operates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the first and even where two acts are not in express terms repugnant yet if the latter act covers the whole subject of the first and embraces new provisions plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first act it will operate as a repeal of that act It was not meant by this statement to say as a casual reading of it might suggest that the mere fact that the latter act covers the whole subject and embraces new provisions demonstrates an intention completely to substitute the latter act for the first This is made apparent by the decision in Henderson s Tobacco 11 Wall 652 657 20 L Ed 235 at the same term where in an opinion delivered by Mr Justice Strong it is said But it must be observed that the doctrine of the Tynen Case asserts no more than that the former statute is impliedly repealed so far as the provisions of the subsequent statute are repugnant to it or so far as the latter statute making new provisions is plainly intended as a substitute for it Where the powers or directions under several acts are such as may well subsist together an implication of repeal cannot be allowed Italics are in the original These two cases with others are briefly reviewed by this court in Red Rock v Henry 106 U S 596 601 1 S Ct 434 439 27 L Ed 251 by Mr Justice Woods and the court s conclusion stated as follows The result of the authorities cited is that when an affirmative statute contains no expression of a purpose to repeal a prior law it does not repeal it unless the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict or unless the later statute covers the whole ground occupied by the earlier and is clearly intended as a substitute for it and the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest The implication of which the cases speak must

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/296/497 (2012-11-09)
    Open archived version from archive



  •