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  • Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board
    registration statement and the Court of Appeals affirmed these orders finding the Fifth Amendment self incrimination issue not ripe for adjudication Held 1 Petitioners claims of the privilege against self incrimination are ripe for adjudication Pp 73 77 a As distinguished from the Communist Party case the contingencies upon which the members duty to register arises have matured the petitioners have claimed the privilege and the Attorney General has rejected such claims Pp 74 75 b Petitioners are faced with the choice of registering without a decision on the merits of their claims or subjecting themselves to serious punishment Pp 75 76 c Respondent s attempt to distinguish between claims of privilege relating to the SACB s power to compel registration and submission of a registration statement concerning which it concedes that the Court of Appeals holding of prematurity was erroneous and claims of privilege against any particular inquiry on the registration form or registration statement is without merit The statute and regulations issued thereunder require petitioners to register and submit the forms fully executed in accordance with present regulations Pp 76 77 2 The requirement of filing the registration form IS 52a is incriminatory within the meaning of the Self Incrimination Clause because the admission of Party membership required by the form might be used as an investigatory lead to or evidence in a criminal prosecution Pp 77 78 p71 3 The requirement of completing and filing the registration statement IS 52 considered apart from the registration form would also be incriminatory because the information might be used as evidence in or supply leads to a criminal prosecution United States v Sullivan 274 U S 259 distinguished Pp 78 79 4 The Act s immunity provision 4 f does not save the orders to register from petitioners Fifth Amendment

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0382_0070_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Alden v. Maine
    cases do not decide the question whether States retain immunity in their own courts notwithstanding an attempted abrogation by Congress Pp 26 31 c Whether Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate a State s immunity in its own courts is then a question of first impression History practice precedent and the Constitution s structure show no compelling evidence that this derogation of the States sovereignty is inherent in the constitutional compact Pp 31 48 1 Turning first to evidence of the original understanding of the Constitution The founders silence regarding the States immunity from suit in their own courts despite the controversy regarding state sovereign immunity in federal court suggests the sovereign s right to assert immunity from suit in its own courts was so well established that no one conceived the new Constitution would alter it The arguments raised for and against the Constitution during ratification confirm this strong inference Similarly nothing in Chisholm the catalyst for the Eleventh Amendment suggested the States were not immune from suits in their own courts The Amendment s language furthermore was directed toward Article III the only constitutional provision believed to call state sovereign immunity into question and nothing in that Article suggested the States could not assert immunity in their own courts or that Congress had the power to abrogate such immunity Finally implicit in a proposal rejected by Congress which would have limited the Amendment s scope to cases where States had made available a remedy in their own courts was the premise that States retained their immunity and the concomitant authority to decide whether to allow private suits against the sovereign in their own courts Pp 31 34 2 The historical analysis is supported by early congressional practice Early Congresses enacted no statutes purporting to authorize suits against nonconsenting States in state court and statutes purporting to authorize such suits in any forum are all but absent in the Nation s historical experience Even recent statutes provide no evidence of an understanding that Congress has a greater power to subject States to suit in their own courts than in federal courts Pp 34 35 3 The theory and reasoning of this Court s earlier cases also suggest that States retain constitutional immunity from suit in their own courts The States immunity has been described in sweeping terms without reference to whether a suit was prosecuted in state or federal court See e g Briscoe v Bank of Kentucky 11 Pet 257 321 322 The Court has said on many occasions that the States retain their immunity in their own courts see e g Beers v Arkansas 20 How 527 529 and has relied on that as a premise in its Eleventh Amendment rulings see e g Hans v Louisiana supra at 10 Pp 35 39 4 A review of the essential principles of federalism and the state courts special role in the constitutional design leads to the conclusion that a congressional power to subject nonconsenting States

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0527_0706_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Allen v. Wright
    that similar histories in various other localities in Mississippi were recited by the plaintiffs without challenge Ibid 30 The relatively simple either or nature of the challenged decision affects the extent to which the initial complaint implicated separation of powers concerns When the IRS altered its policy concerning the grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools see Green v Connally 330 F Supp at 1156 the plaintiffs were left

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0468_0737_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus
    meeting the qualifications of 401 of the Internal Revenue Code was subject to a pension funding charge if he terminated the plan or closed a Minnesota office The charge was assessed if the pension funds were insufficient to cover full pensions for all employees who had worked at least 10 years and periods of employment prior to the effective date of the Act were to be included in the 10 year employment criterion Shortly thereafter in a move planned before passage of the Act appellant closed its Minnesota office and several of its employees who were then discharged had no vested pension rights under appellant s plan but had worked for appellant for 10 years or more thus qualifying as pension obligees under the Act Subsequently the State notified appellant that it owed a pension funding charge of 185 000 under the Act Appellant then brought suit in Federal District Court for injunctive and declaratory relief claiming that the Act unconstitutionally impaired its contractual obligations to its employees under its pension plan but the court upheld the Act as applied to appellant Held The application of the Act to appellant violates the Contract Clause of the Constitution which provides that n o State shall pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts Pp 240 251 p235 a While the Contract Clause does not operate to obliterate the police power of the States it does impose some limits upon the power of a State to abridge existing contractual relationships even in the exercise of its otherwise legitimate police power Legislation adjusting the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties must be upon reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its adoption United States Trust Co v New Jersey 431 U S 1 22 Pp 242 244 b

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0438_0234_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.
    Valley Plaza Inc CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No 478 Argued March 14 1968 Decided May 20 1968 Respondent Weis Markets owns and operates a supermarket in a large shopping center complex owned by respondent Logan Valley Plaza In front of Weis building is a covered porch and a parcel pickup zone Members of petitioner union picketed Weis store confining the picketing almost entirely to the parcel pickup zone and the portion of the parking area adjacent thereto The picketing was peaceful with some sporadic and infrequent congestion of the parcel pickup area A Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas enjoined picketing and trespassing upon the Weis storeroom porch and parcel pick up area and the Logan parking area thus preventing picketing inside the shopping center That court held the injunction justified in order to protect respondents property rights and because the picketing was unlawfully aimed at coercing Weis to compel its employees to join a union The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the injunction on the sole ground that petitioners conduct constituted a trespass on respondents property Held 1 Peaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the public is absent other factors involving the purpose or the manner of the picketing protected by the First Amendment Pp 313 315 2 Although there may be regulation of the manner in which handbilling or picketing is carried out that does not mean that either can be barred under all circumstances on publicly owned property simply by recourse to traditional concepts of property law concerning the incidents of ownership of real property Pp 315 316 3 Since the shopping center serves as the community business block and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing through Marsh v Alabama 326

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0391_0308_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Ambach v. Norwick
    apply for citizenship does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Pp 72 81 a As a general principle some state functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as a governmental entity as to permit exclusion from those functions of all persons who have not become part of the process of self government Accordingly a State is required to justify its exclusion of aliens from such governmental positions only by a showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification Foley v Connelie 435 U S 291 296 Pp 73 74 b This rule for governmental functions which is an exception to the stricter general standard applicable to classifications based on alienage rests on important principles inherent in the Constitution The distinction between citizens and aliens though ordinarily irrelevant to private activity is fundamental to the definition and government of a State and the references to such distinction in the Constitution itself indicate that the status of citizenship was meant to have significance in the structure of our government It is because of this special significance of citizenship that governmental entities when exercising the functions of government have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens P 75 c Taking into consideration the role of public education and the degree of responsibility and discretion teachers possess in fulfilling that role it is clear that public school teachers come well within the governmental function principle recognized in Sugarman v Dougall 413 U S 634 and Foley v Connelie supra and accordingly the Constitution requires only that a citizenship requirement applicable to teaching in the public school bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest Pp 75 80 p69 d Here the statute in question does bear

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0441_0068_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • American Communications Assn. v. Douds
    the Government it also imposes on them a number of restrictions which would not exist if the National Labor Relations Act had not been enacted However it does not prohibit persons who do not sign the prescribed affidavit from holding union office Pp 389 390 3 The remedy provided by 9 h bears reasonable relation to the evil which it was designed to reach since Congress might reasonably find that Communists unlike members of other political parties and persons who believe in the overthrow of the Government by force unlike persons of other beliefs represent a continuing danger of disruptive political strikes when they hold positions of union leadership Pp 390 393 p383 4 Section 9 h is designed to protect the public not against what Communists and others identified therein advocate or believe but against what Congress has concluded they have done and are likely to do again and the probable effects of the statute upon the free exercise of the right of speech and assembly must be weighed against the congressional determination that political strikes are evils of conduct which cause substantial harm to interstate commerce and that Communists and others identified by 9 h pose continuing threats to that public interest when in positions of union leadership Pp 393 400 5 In view of the complexity of the problem of political strikes and how to deal with their leaders the public interest in the good faith exercise of the great powers entrusted by Congress to labor bargaining representatives under the National Labor Relations Act the fact that 9 h touches only a relatively few persons who combine certain political affiliations or beliefs with the occupancy of positions of great power over the economy of the country and the fact that injury to interstate commerce would be an accomplished fact before any sanctions could be applied the legislative judgment that interstate commerce must be protected from a continuing threat of political strikes is a permissible one in this case Pp 400 406 6 The belief identified in 9 h is a belief in the objective of overthrow by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods of the Government of the United States as it now exists under the Constitution and laws thereof The sole effect of the statute upon one who holds such beliefs is that he may be forced to relinquish his position as a union leader So construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding the problem 9 h does not unduly infringe freedoms protected by the First Amendment Pp 406 412 7 Section 9 h is not unconstitutionally vague it does not violate the prohibition of Article I 9 of the Constitution against bills of attainder or ex post facto laws and it does not require a test oath contrary to the provision of Article VI that no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States Pp 412 415 No 10 Although the

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0339_0382_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Apodaca v. Oregon
    applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Duncan v Louisiana 391 U S 145 does not require that the jury s vote be unanimous Pp 410 412 a The Amendment s essential purpose of interpos ing between the accused and his accuser the common sense judgment of a group of laymen representative of a cross section of the community Williams v Florida 399 U S 78 100 is served despite the absence of a unanimity requirement Pp 410 411 b Petitioners argument that the Sixth Amendment requires jury unanimity in order to effectuate the reasonable doubt standard otherwise mandated by due process requirements is without merit since that Amendment does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt at all Pp 411 412 2 Jury unanimity is not mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment requirements that racial minorities not be systematically excluded from the jury selection process even when racial minority members are on the jury it does not follow that their views will not be just as rationally considered by the other jury members as would be the case under a unanimity rule Pp 412 414 MR JUSTICE POWELL concluded that 1 Although on the basis of history and precedent the Sixth Amendment mandates unanimity in a federal jury trial the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment while requiring States to provide jury trials for serious crimes does not incorporate p405 all the elements of a jury trial within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and does not require jury unanimity Oregon s ten of twelve rule is not violative of due process Pp 369 377 2 Nor is the Oregon provision inconsistent with the due process requirement that a jury be drawn from a representative cross section of the community as the jury majority remains under the duty to

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0406_0404_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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