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  • Delaware v. Prouse
    been wholly capricious and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Held 1 This Court has jurisdiction in this case even though the Delaware Supreme Court held that the stop at issue not only violated the Federal Constitution but also was impermissible under the Delaware Constitution That court s opinion shows that even if the State Constitution would have provided an adequate basis for the judgment below the court did not intend to rest its decision independently on the State Constitution its holding instead depending upon its view of the reach of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment s Pp 651 653 2 Except where there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment Pp 653 663 a Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment s even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests Pp 653 655 p649 b The State s interest in discretionary spot checks as a means of ensuring the safety of its roadways does not outweigh the resulting intrusion on the privacy and security of the persons detained Given the physical and psychological intrusion visited upon the occupants of a vehicle by a random stop to check documents cf United States

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0440_0648_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Dennis v. United States
    knowingly or willfully to advocate the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the United States by force or violence to organize or help to organize any group which does so or to conspire to do so do not violate the First Amendment or other provisions of the Bill of Rights and do not violate the First or Fifth Amendment s because of indefiniteness Pp 495 499 517 2 Petitioners leaders of the Communist Party in this country were indicted in a federal district court under 3 of the Smith Act for willfully and knowingly conspiring 1 to organize as the Communist Party a group of persons to teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence and 2 knowingly and willfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United States by force and violence The trial judge instructed the jury that they could not convict unless they found that petitioners intended to overthrow the Government as speedily as circumstances would permit but that if they so found then as a matter of law there was sufficient danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent to justify application of the statute under the First Amendment Petitioners were convicted and the convictions were sustained by the Court of Appeals This Court granted certiorari limited to the questions 1 Whether either 2 or 3 of the Smith Act inherently or as construed and applied in the instant case violates the First Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights and 2 whether either 2 or 3 inherently or as construed and applied in the instant case violates the First and Fifth Amendment s because of indefiniteness Held The convictions

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0341_0494_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Department of Commerce v. United States House
    Wright 468 U S 737 751 A plaintiff must establish that there exists no genuine issue of material fact as to justiciability or the merits in order to prevail on a summary judgment motion See e g Lujan v National Wildlife Federation 497 U S 871 884 The present controversy is justiciable because several of the appellees have met their burden of proof regarding their standing to bring this suit In support of their summary judgment motion appellees submitted an affidavit that demonstrates that it is a virtual certainty that Indiana where appellee Hofmeister resides will lose a House seat under the proposed census 2000 plan That loss undoubtedly satisfies the injury in fact requirement for standing since Indiana residents votes will be diluted by the loss of a Representative See e g Baker v Carr 369 U S 186 208 Hofmeister also meets the second and third standing requirements There is undoubtedly a traceable connection between the use of sampling in the decennial census and Indiana s expected loss of a Representative and there is a substantial likelihood that the requested relief a permanent injunction against the proposed uses of sampling in the census will redress the alleged injury Appellees have also established standing on the basis of the expected effects of the use of sampling in the 2000 census on intrastate redistricting Appellees have demonstrated that voters in nine counties including several of the appellees are substantially likely to suffer intrastate vote dilution as a result of the Bureau s plan Several of the States in which the counties are located require use of federal decennial census population numbers for their state legislative redistricting and States use the population numbers generated by the federal decennial census for federal congressional redistricting Appellees living in the nine counties therefore have a strong claim that they will be injured because their votes will be diluted vis à vis residents of counties with larger undercount rates The expected intrastate vote dilution satisfies the injury in fact causation and redressibility requirements Pp 10 16 2 The Census Act prohibits the proposed uses of statistical sampling to determine the population for congressional apportionment purposes In 1976 the provisions here at issue took their present form Congress revised 13 U S C 141 a which authorizes the Secretary to take a decennial census in such form and content as he may determine including the use of sampling procedures This broad grant of authority is informed however by the narrower and more specific 195 See Green v Bock Laundry Machine Co 490 U S 504 524 As amended in 1976 195 provides Except for the determination of population for purposes of congressional apportionment the Secretary shall if he considers it feasible authorize the use of statistical sampling in carrying out the provisions of this title Section 195 requires the Secretary to use sampling in assembling the myriad demographic data that are collected in connection with the decennial census but it maintains the longstanding prohibition on the

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0525_0326_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
    failure to provide petitioner with adequate protection against his father s violence did not violate his rights under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause Pp 194 203 a A State s failure to protect an individual against private violence generally does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause because the Clause imposes no duty on the State to provide members of the general public with adequate protective services The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State s power to act not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security while it forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life liberty and property without due process of law its language cannot fairly be read to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means Pp 194 197 b There is no merit to petitioner s contention that the State s knowledge of his danger and expressions of willingness to protect him against that danger established a special relationship giving rise to an affirmative constitutional duty to protect While certain special relationships created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty enforceable through the Due Process p190 Clause to provide adequate protection see Estelle v Gamble 429 U S 97 429 U S 97 429 U S 97 Youngberg v Romeo 457 U S 307 the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State s knowledge of the individual s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf through imprisonment institutionalization or other similar restraint of personal liberty No such duty existed

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0489_0189_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Doe v. Bolton
    complaint included Georgia licensed physicians who claimed that the Georgia statutes chilled and deterred their practices registered nurses clergymen and social workers Though holding that all the plaintiffs had standing the District Court ruled that only Doe presented a justiciable controversy In Doe s case the court gave declaratory but not injunctive relief invalidating as an infringement of privacy and personal liberty the limitation to the three situations specified in 26 1202 a and certain other provisions but holding that the State s interest in health protection and the existence of a potential of independent human existence justified regulation through 26 1202 b of the manner of performance as well as the quality of the final decision to abort The appellants claiming entitlement to broader relief directly appealed to this Court Held 1 Doe s case presents a live justiciable controversy and she has standing to sue Roe v Wade ante p 113 as do the physician p180 appellants who unlike the physician in Wade were not charged with abortion violations and it is therefore unnecessary to resolve the issue of the other appellants standing Pp 187 189 2 A woman s constitutional right to an abortion is not absolute Roe v Wade supra P 189 3 The requirement that a physician s decision to perform an abortion must rest upon his best clinical judgment of its necessity is not unconstitutionally vague since that judgment may be made in the light of all the attendant circumstances United States v Vuitch 402 U S 62 71 72 Pp 191 192 4 The three procedural conditions in 26 1202 b violate the Fourteenth Amendment Pp 192 200 a The JCAH accreditation requirement is invalid since the State has not shown that only hospitals let alone those with JCAH accreditation meet its interest

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0410_0179_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Doe v. McMillan
    report on the D C school system that included identification of students in derogatory contexts The named defendants included members of a House committee Committee employees a Committee investigator and a consultant the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents and officials and employees connected with the school system The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court s dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the first two categories of defendants were immune by reason of the Speech or Debate Clause and that the D C officials and the legislative employees were protected by the official immunity doctrine recognized in Barr v Matteo 360 U S 564 Held 1 The congressional committee members members of their staff the consultant and the investigator are absolutely immune under the Speech or Debate Clause insofar as they engaged in the legislative acts of compiling the report referring it to the House or voting for its publication Pp 311 313 2 The Clause does not afford absolute immunity from private suit to persons who with authorization from Congress perform the function which is not part of the legislative process of publicly distributing materials that allegedly infringe upon the rights of individuals The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that respondents who except for the Committee members and personnel were charged with such public distribution were protected by the Clause Pp 313 318 3 The Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents are protected by the doctrine of official immunity enunciated in Barr v Matteo supra for publishing and distributing the report only to the extent that they served legitimate legislative functions in doing so and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that their immunity extended beyond that limit Pp 318 324 p307 WHITE J delivered the opinion of the Court in

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0412_0306_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Dothard v. Rawlinson
    that with respect to such standards appellee had made out a prima facie case of unlawful sex discrimination which appellants had failed to rebut The court also found the challenged regulation impermissible under Title VII as being based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes and rejecting appellants bona fide occupational qualification defense under 703 e of Title VII ruled that being male was not such a qualification for the job of correctional counselor in a contact position in an Alabama male maximum security penitentiary Held 1 The District Court did not err in holding that Title VII prohibited application of the statutory height and weight requirements to appellee and the class she represents Pp 328 332 a To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination a plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral standards in question such as Alabama s height and weight standards select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern and here the showing of the disproportionate impact of the height and weight standards on women based on national statistics rather than on comparative statistics p332 of actual applicants sufficed to make out a prima facie case Pp 328 331 b Appellants failed to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination on the basis that the height and weight requirements are job related in that they have a relationship to the strength essential to efficient job performance as a correctional counselor where appellants produced no evidence correlating such requirements with the requisite amount of strength thought essential to good job performance and in fact failed to offer evidence of any kind in specific justification of the statutory standards P 331 2 In the particular circumstances of this case the District Court erred in rejecting appellants contention that the regulation in question falls within the narrow

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0433_0321_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Doyle v. Ohio
    THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TUSCARAWAS COUNTY No 75 5014 Argued February 23 1976 Decided June 17 1976 During the course of their state criminal trials petitioners who after arrest were given warnings in line with Miranda v Arizona 384 U S 436 467 473 took the stand and gave an exculpatory story that they had not previously told to the police or the prosecutor Over their counsel s objection they were cross examined as to why they had not given the arresting officer the exculpatory explanations Petitioners were convicted and their convictions were upheld on appeal Held The use for impeachment purposes of petitioners silence at the time of arrest and after they received Miranda warnings violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Post arrest silence following such warnings is insolubly ambiguous moreover it would be fundamentally unfair to allow an arrestee s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently given at trial after he had been impliedly assured by the Miranda warnings that silence would carry no penalty Pp 616 620 Reversed and remanded POWELL J delivered the opinion of the Court in which BURGER C J and BRENNAN STEWART WHITE and MARSHALL

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0426_0610_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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