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  • Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell
    libel claim specifically finding that the parody could not reasonably be understood as describing actual facts or events but ruled in his favor on the emotional distress claim stating that he should be awarded compensatory and punitive damages The Court of Appeals affirmed rejecting petitioners contention that the actual malice standard of New York Times Co v Sullivan 376 U S 254 must be met before respondent can recover for emotional distress Rejecting as irrelevant the contention that because the jury found that the parody did not describe actual facts the ad was an opinion protected by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution the court ruled that the issue was whether the ad s publication was sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress Held In order to protect the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern the First and Fourteenth Amendment s prohibit public figures and public officials from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with actual malice i e with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true The State s interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is not sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved Here respondent is clearly a public figure for First Amendment purposes and the lower courts finding that the ad parody was not reasonably believable must be

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0485_0046_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Hutchinson v. Proxmire
    release since it fell within the informing function of Congress The court further held that petitioner was a public figure for purposes of determining respondents liability that respondents were protected by the First Amendment thereby requiring petitioner to prove actual malice and that based on the depositions affidavits and pleadings there was no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of actual malice neither respondents failure to investigate nor unfair editing and summarizing being sufficient to establish actual malice Finally the court held that even if petitioner were found to be a private person relevant state law required a summary judgment for respondents The Court of Appeals affirmed holding that the Speech or Debate Clause protected the statements made in the press release and newsletters and that although the followup telephone calls and the statements made on television were not protected by that Clause they were protected by the First Amendment since petitioner was a public figure and that on the record there was no showing of actual malice p112 Held 1 While this Court s practice is to avoid reaching constitutional questions if a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available special considerations in this case mandate that the constitutional questions first be resolved If respondents have immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause no other questions need be considered And where it appears that the Court of Appeals would not affirm the District Court s state law holding so that the appeal could not be decided without reaching the First Amendment issue that issue will also be reached here Pp 122 123 2 The Speech or Debate Clause does not protect transmittal of information by individual Members of Congress by press releases and newsletters Pp 123 133 a There is nothing in the history of the Clause or its language suggesting any intent to create an absolute privilege from liability or suit for defamatory statements made outside the legislative Chambers precedents support the conclusion that a Member may be held liable for republishing defamatory statements originally made in the Chamber Pp 127 130 b Neither the newsletters nor the press release here was essential to the deliberation of the Senate and neither was part of the deliberative process Gravel v United States 408 U S 606 408 U S 606 408 U S 606 Doe v McMillan 412 U S 306 P 130 c The newsletters and press release were not privileged as part of the informing function of Members of Congress to tell the public about their activities Individual Members transmittal of information about their activities by press releases and newsletters is not part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make up the legislative process in contrast to voting and preparing committee reports which are part of Congress function to inform itself newsletters and press releases are primarily means of informing those outside t he legislative forum and represent the views and will of a single Member Doe v McMillan supra distinguished Pp 132 133 3

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0443_0111_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District
    a board of education granted under its general supervisory powers over the use of public school buildings religious teachers employed subject to the approval and supervision of the superintendent of schools by a private religious group including representatives of the Catholic Protestant and Jewish faiths gave religious instruction in public school buildings once each week Pupils whose parents so requested were excused from their secular classes during the periods of religious instruction and were required to attend the religious classes but other pupils were not released from their public school duties which were compulsory under state law A resident and taxpayer of the school district whose child was enrolled in the public schools sued in a state court for a writ of mandamus requiring the board of education to terminate this practice Held 1 A judgment of the State Supreme Court sustaining denial of the writ of mandamus on the ground that the state statutes granted the board of education authority to establish such a program drew into question the validity of a statute of the State within the meaning of 237 of the Judicial Code and was appealable to this Court P 206 2 As a resident and taxpayer of the school district and the parent of a child required by state law to attend the school appellant had standing to maintain the suit P 206 3 Both state courts having ruled expressly on appellant s claim that the state program violated the Federal Constitution a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant failed properly to present that question in the State Supreme Court cannot be sustained P 207 4 This utilization of the State s tax supported public school system and its machinery for compulsory public school attendance to enable sectarian groups to give religious

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0333_0203_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Illinois v. Gates
    that corroboration of incriminating facts would be needed See ibid 6 As noted supra at 277 282 Aguilar and Spinelli inform the police of what information they have to provide and magistrates of what information they should demand This advances the important process value which is intimately related to substantive Fourth Amendment concerns of having magistrates rather than police or informants determine whether there is probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant We want the police to provide magistrates with the information on which they base their conclusions so that magistrates can perform their important function When the police rely on facts about which they have personal knowledge requiring them to disclose those facts to magistrates imposes no significant burden on the police When the police rely on information obtained from confidential informants requiring the police to disclose the facts on which the informants based their conclusions imposes a more substantial burden on the police but it is one that they can meet because they presumably have access to their confidential informants In cases in which the police rely on information obtained from an anonymous informant the police by hypothesis cannot obtain further information from the informant regarding the facts and circumstances on which the informant based his conclusion When the police seek a warrant based solely on an anonymous informant s tip therefore they are providing the magistrate with all the information on which they have based their conclusion In this respect the command of Aguilar and Spinelli has been met and the process value identified above has been served But Aguilar and Spinelli advance other values which argue for their application even to anonymous informants tips They structure the magistrate s probable cause inquiry and more importantly they guard against findings of probable cause and attendant intrusions based on anything other than information which magistrates reasonably can conclude has been obtained in a reliable way by an honest or credible person 7 In Jaben v United States the Court considered whether there was probable cause to support a complaint charging petitioner with willfully filing a false tax return 381 U S at 221 After reviewing the extensive detail contained in the complaint id at 223 the Court expressly distinguished tax offenses from other types of offenses Some offenses are subject to putative establishment by blunt and concise factual allegations e g A saw narcotics in B s possession whereas A saw B file a false tax return does not mean very much in a tax evasion case Establishment of grounds for belief that the offense of tax evasion has been committed often requires a reconstruction of the taxpayer s income from many individually unrevealing facts which are not susceptible of a concise statement in a complaint Furthermore unlike narcotics informants for example whose credibility may often be suspect the sources in this tax evasion case are much less likely to produce false or untrustworthy information Thus whereas some supporting information concerning the credibility of informants in

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0462_0213_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • In re Debs
    companies to leave the service of the companies and prevent such companies and the receivers from securing other persons to take their places that they issued orders notifications etc to the members of the railway union to leave the service of the companies and receivers and to prevent the companies and receivers from operating their trains that they had asserted that they could and would tie up paralyze and break down any and every of said railway companies and receivers which did not accede to their demands that in pursuance of the instructions commands and requests of said officers large numbers of the employees of the railway companies and receivers left their service Then followed these allegations And your orator further charges that said defendants aimed and intended and do now aim and intend in and by the said conspiracy and combination to secure unto themselves the entire control of the interstate industrial and commercial business in which the population of the city of Chicago and of the other communities along the lines of road of said railways are engaged with each other and to restrain any and all other persons from any independent control or management of such interstate industrial or commercial enterprises save according to the will and with the consent of the defendants p568 Your orator further avers that in pursuance of said combination and conspiracy and to accomplish the purpose thereof as hereinbefore set forth the said defendants Debs Howard Rogers Keliher and others officers of said American Railway Union issued or caused to be issued the orders and directions as above set forth and that in obedience of such orders and in pursuance of said conspiracy and combination numerous employees of said railroad companies and receivers unitedly refused to obey the orders of said employers or to perform the usual duties of such service and many others of such employees quit such service with the common purpose and with the result of preventing said railroad companies and receivers from operating their said railroads and from transporting the United States mails and from carrying on or conducting their duties as common carriers of interstate traffic Your orator further avers that pursuant to said combination and conspiracy and under the direction as aforesaid of said officers and directors of said American Railway Union said other defendants and other persons whose names are to your orator unknown proceeded by collecting together in large numbers by threats intimidation force and violence at the station grounds yards and right of way of said railroad companies respectively in the State of Illinois to prevent said railroad companies from employing other persons to fill the vacancies aforesaid to compel others still employees of said railroad companies to quit such employment and to refuse to perform the duties of their service and to prevent the persons remaining in such service and ready and willing to perform the duties of the same from doing so Your orator further avers that said defendants in pursuance of said combination and conspiracy acting under the direction of said officers and directors of said American Railway Union did with force and violence at divers times and places within said State of Illinois and elsewhere stop obstruct and derail and wreck the engines and trains of said railroad companies both passenger and freight then and there engaged in interstate commerce and in transporting United States mails by locking the switches of the railroad of said p569 railroad companies by removing the spikes and rails from the track thereof by turning switches and displacing and destroying signals by assaulting and interfering with and disabling the switchmen and other employs of said railroad companies having charge of the signals switches and tracks of said companies and the movement of trains thereon and in other manners by force and violence depriving the employees of said railroad companies in charge of such trains of the control and management of the same and by these and other unlawful means attempted to obtain and exercise absolute control and domination over the entire operations of said railroads The bill further set forth that there had become established in the city of Chicago a business conducted under the name of the Union Stock Yards at which for many years immense numbers of livestock from States and Territories beyond the State of Illinois had been received slaughtered and converted into food products and distributed to all quarters of the globe and that all the large centres of population in the United States were in a great degree dependent upon those stockyards for their food supply of that character that for the purpose of handling such livestock and the product thereof the company conducting such business operated certain railroad tracks and that in pursuance of the combination and conspiracy aforesaid the four defendants officers of the railway union issued orders directing all the employs handling such railroad tracks to abandon such service To this was added the following And your orator further alleges that in pursuance of the like combination and unlawful conspiracy the said defendants and others combining and conspiring with them for the purpose of still further restraining and preventing the conduct of such business have by menaces threats and intimidation prevented the employment of other persons to take the place of the employees quitting the service of said company so operating said Union Stock Yards And your orator further charges that by reason of said unlawful combination and conspiracy and the acts and doings aforesaid thereunder the supply of coal and fuel for consumption p570 throughout the different States of the Union and of grain breadstuffs vegetables fruits meats and other necessaries of life has been cut off interrupted and interfered with and the market therefor made largely unavailable and dealers in all of said various products and the consumers thereof have been greatly injured and trade and commerce therein among the States has been restrained obstructed and largely destroyed The bill alleged that the defendants

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0158_0564_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • In re Gault
    a juvenile court adjudication of delinquency as a requirement which is part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution The holding in this case relates only to the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile process where commitment to a state institution may follow When proceedings may result in incarceration in an institution of p2 confinement it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and exercise of care implied in the phrase due process Pp 12 31 2 Due process requires in such proceedings that adequate written notice be afforded the child and his parents or guardian Such notice must inform them of the specific issues that they must meet and must be given at the earliest practicable time and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation Notice here was neither timely nor adequately specific nor was there waiver of the right to constitutionally adequate notice Pp 31 34 3 In such proceedings the child and his parents must be advised of their right to be represented by counsel and if they are unable to afford counsel that counsel will be appointed to represent the child Mrs Gault s statement at the habeas corpus hearing that she had known she could employ counsel is not an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known right Pp 34 42 4 The constitutional privilege against self incrimination is applicable in such proceedings an admission by the juvenile may not be used against him in the absence of clear and unequivocal evidence that the admission was made with knowledge that he was not obliged to speak and would not be penalized for remaining silent T he availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0387_0001_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • In re Neagle
    deputy marshal for the express purpose of guarding Mr Justice Field against an attack by Terry and his wife which might result in his death that such an attack did take place that Neagle being there for the said purpose of affording protection had just reason to believe that the attack would result in the death of Mr Justice Field unless he interfered and that he did justifiably interfere by shooting Terry while in the act of assaulting Mr Justice Field whom he had already struck two or three times Held 1 That eagle was justified in defending Mr Justice Field in this manner 2 That in so doing he acted in discharge of his duty as an officer of the United States 3 That having so acted in that capacity he could not be guilty of murder under the laws of California nor held to answer to its courts for an act for which he had the authority of the laws of the United States 4 That the judgment of the Circuit Court discharging him from the custody of the sheriff of San Joaquin County must therefore he affirmed MR JUSTICE MILLER on behalf of the court stated the case as follows This was an appeal by Cunningham sheriff of the county of San Joaquin in the State of California from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California discharging David Neagle from the custody of said sheriff who held him a prisoner on a charge of murder On the 16th day of August 1889 there was presented to Judge Sawyer the Circuit Judge of the United States for the Ninth Circuit embracing the Northern District of California a petition signed David Neagle deputy United States marshal by A T Farrish on his behalf This petition represented that p4 the said Farrish was a deputy marshal duly appointed for the Northern District of California by J C Franks who was the marshal of that district It further alleged that David Neagle was at the time of the occurrences recited in the petition and at the time of filing it a duly appointed and acting deputy United States marshal for the same district It then proceeded to state that said Neagle was imprisoned confined and restrained of his liberty in the county jail in San Joaquin County in the State of California by Thomas Cunningham sheriff of said county upon a charge of murder under a warrant of arrest a copy of which was annexed to the petition The warrant was as follows In the Justice s Court of Stockton Township STATE OF CALIFORNIA ss COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN The People of the State of California to any sheriff constable marshal or policeman of said State or of the county of San Joaquin Information on oath having been this day laid before me by Sarah A Terry that the crime of murder a felony has been committed within said County of San

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0135_0001_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • In re Primus
    First Amendment protection as to which government may regulate only with narrow specificity Button supra at 429 431 433 Pp 422 425 b Subsequent decisions have interpreted Button as establishing the principle that collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment United Transportation Union v Michigan Bar 401 U S 576 585 and have required that broad rules framed to protect the public and to preserve respect for the administration of justice must not work a significant impairment of the value of associational freedoms Mine Workers v Illinois Bar Assn 389 U S 217 222 P 426 c Appellant s activity in this case comes within the generous zone of protection reserved for associational freedoms because she engaged in solicitation by mail on behalf of a bona fide nonprofit organization that pursues litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and association as well as a means of communicating useful information to the public There is nothing in the record to suggest that the ACLU p413 or its South Carolina affiliate is an organization dedicated exclusively to providing legal services or a group of attorneys that exists for the purpose of financial gain through the recovery of counsel fees or a mere sham to evade a valid state rule against solicitation for pecuniary gain Pp 426 432 d The Disciplinary Rules in question which sweep broadly rather than regulating with the degree of precision required in the context of political expression and association have a distinct potential for dampening the kind of cooperative activity that would make advocacy of litigation meaningful Button supra at 438 as well as for permitting discretionary enforcement against unpopular causes P 433 e Although a showing of potential danger may suffice in

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0436_0412_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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