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  • Lockhart v. McCree
    phase of a bifurcated capital trial of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the trial This is so even assuming arguendo that the social science studies introduced in the courts below were adequate to establish that death qualification in fact produces juries somewhat more conviction prone than non death qualified juries Pp 173 183 a Death qualification of a jury does not violate the fair cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment which applies to jury panels or venires but does not require that petit juries actually chosen reflect the composition of the community at large Even if the requirement were extended to petit juries the essence of a fair cross section claim is the systematic exclusion of a distinctive group in the community p163 such as blacks women and Mexican Americans for reasons completely unrelated to the ability of members of the group to serve as jurors in a particular case Groups defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that would prevent or substantially impair members of the group from performing one of their duties as jurors such as the Witherspoon excludables at issue here are not distinctive groups for fair cross section purposes Death qualification is carefully designed to serve the State s legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial Pp 173 177 b Nor does death qualification of a jury violate the constitutional right to an impartial jury on the theory asserted by respondent that because all individual jurors are to some extent predisposed towards one result or

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0476_0162_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Loewe v. Lawlor
    the Judiciary Act of 1891 to decide the whole matter in controversy in the same manner as if it had been brought here for review by writ of error or appeal The Anti Trust Act of July 2 1890 26 Stat 209 has a broader application that the prohibition of restraints of trade unlawful at common law p275 It prohibits any combination which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce between the States or restricts in that regard the liberty of a trader to engage in business and this includes restraints of trade aimed at compelling third parties and strangers involuntarily not to engage in the course of interstate trade except on conditions that the combination imposes A combination may be in restraint of interstate trade and within the meaning of the Anti Trust Act although the persons exercising the restraint may not themselves be engaged in interstate trade and some of the means employed may be acts within a State and individually beyond the scope of Federal authority and operate to destroy intrastate trade as interstate trade but the acts must be considered as a whole and if the purposes are to prevent interstate transportation the plan is open to condemnation under the Anti Trust Act of July 2 1890 Swift v United States 196 U S 375 The Anti Trust Act of July 2 1890 makes no distinction between classes Organizations of farmers and laborers were not exempted from its operation notwithstanding the efforts which the records of Congress show were made in that direction A combination of labor organizations and the members thereof to compel a manufacturer whose goods are almost entirely sold in other States to unionize his shops and on his refusal so to do to boycott his goods and prevent their sale in States

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0208_0274_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
    York Court of Appeals also upheld the statute holding that it serves the legitimate police power purpose of eliminating landlord fees and conditions that inhibit the development of CATV which has important educational and community benefits Rejecting appellant s argument that a physical occupation authorized by government is necessarily a taking the court further held that the statute did not have an excessive economic impact upon appellant when measured against her aggregate property rights did not interfere with any reasonable investment backed expectations and accordingly did not work a taking of appellant s property Held The New York statute works a taking of a portion of appellant s property for which she is entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment Pp 425 441 a When the character of the governmental action Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City 438 U S 104 124 is a permanent physical occupation of real property there is a taking to the extent p420 of the occupation without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner Pp 426 435 b To the extent that the government permanently occupies physical property it effectively destroys the owner s rights to possess use and dispose of the property Moreover the owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger invades and occupies the owner s property Such an invasion is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property since the owner may have no control over the timing extent or nature of the invasion And constitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied Pp 435 438 c Here

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0458_0419_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber
    of murder and sentenced to be electrocuted A warrant for his execution was duly issued He was prepared for electrocution placed in the electric chair and subjected to a shock which was intended to cause his death but which failed to do so presumably because of some mechanical difficulty He was removed from the chair and returned to prison but another warrant for his execution at a later date was issued Held 1 Assuming but not deciding that violations of the principles of the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment would violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a The proposed execution would not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment P 462 b It would not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment P 463 p460 2 The proposed execution would not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment P 465 3 The record of the original trial showing the warrant of arrest the indictment the appointment of counsel and the minute entries of trial selection of jury verdict and sentence contains nothing on which this Court

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0329_0459_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Loving v. Virginia
    version PDF version HTML version PDF version Syllabus SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 388 U S 1 Loving v Virginia APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA No 395 Argued April 10 1967 Decided June 12 1967 Virginia s statutory scheme to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications held to violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0388_0001_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
    failure to attack the Act s validity to accept the legislature s uncontested findings that new construction in the coastal zone threatened a valuable public resource The court ruled that under the Mugler v Kansas 123 U S 623 line of cases when a regulation is designed to prevent harmful or noxious uses of property akin to public nuisances no compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the regulation s effect on the property s value Held 1 Lucas takings claim is not rendered unripe by the fact that he may yet be able to secure a special permit to build on his property under an amendment to the Act passed after briefing and argument before the State Supreme Court but prior to issuance of that court s opinion Because it declined to rest its judgment on ripeness grounds preferring to dispose of the case on the merits the latter court s decision precludes both practically and legally any takings claim with respect to Lucas preamendment deprivation Lucas has properly alleged injury in fact with respect to this preamendment deprivation and it would not accord with sound process in these circumstances to insist that he pursue the late created procedure before that component of his takings claim can be considered ripe Pp 1010 1014 p1004 2 The State Supreme Court erred in applying the harmful or noxious uses principle to decide this case Pp 1014 1032 a Regulations that deny the property owner all economically viable use of his land constitute one of the discrete categories of regulatory deprivations that require compensation without the usual case specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint Although the Court has never set forth the justification for this categorical rule the practical and economic equivalence of physically appropriating and eliminating all beneficial use of land counsels its preservation Pp 1014 1019 b A review of the relevant decisions demonstrates that the harmful or noxious use principle was merely this Court s early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain without compensation any regulatory diminution in value that the distinction between regulation that prevents harmful use and that which confers benefits is difficult if not impossible to discern on an objective value free basis and that therefore noxious use logic cannot be the basis for departing from this Court s categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated Pp 1020 1026 c Rather the question must turn in accord with this Court s takings jurisprudence on citizens historic understandings regarding the content of and the State s power over the bundle of rights that they acquire when they take title to property Because it is not consistent with the historical compact embodied in the Takings Clause that title to real estate is held subject to the State s subsequent decision to eliminate all economically beneficial use a regulation having that effect cannot be newly decreed and sustained without compensation s being paid the owner However

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0505_1003_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc.
    Court under 1983 alleging that in attaching his property respondents had acted jointly with the State to deprive him of his property without due process of law The District Court held that the alleged actions of the respondents did not constitute state action as required by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the complaint therefore did not state a valid claim under 1983 The Court of Appeals affirmed but on the basis that the complaint failed to allege conduct under color of state law for purposes of 1983 because there was neither usurpation or corruption of official power by a private litigant nor a surrender of judicial power to the private litigant in such a way that the independence of the enforcing officer was compromised to a significant degree Held 1 Constitutional requirements of due process apply to garnishment and prejudgment attachment procedures whenever state officers act jointly with a private creditor in securing the property in dispute Sniadach v Family Finance Corp 395 U S 337 And if the challenged conduct of the creditor constitutes state action as delimited by this Court s prior decisions then that conduct is also action under color of state law and will support a suit under 1983 Pp 926 935 p923 2 Conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a constitutional right protected against infringement by a State must be fairly attributable to the State In determining the question of fair attribution a the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by it or by a person for whom it is responsible and b the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor either because he is a

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0457_0922_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
    that respondents lack standing to seek judicial review of the rule Pp 559 567 571 578 a As the parties invoking federal jurisdiction respondents bear the burden of showing standing by establishing inter alia that they have suffered an injury in fact i e a concrete and particularized actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest To survive a summary judgment motion they must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts to support their claim Standing is particularly difficult to show here since third parties rather than respondents are the object of the Government action or inaction to which respondents object Pp 559 562 p556 b Respondents did not demonstrate that they suffered an injury in fact Assuming that they established that funded activities abroad threaten certain species they failed to show that one or more of their members would thereby be directly affected apart from the members special interest in the subject See Sierra Club v Morton 405 U S 727 735 Affidavits of members claiming an intent to revisit project sites at some indefinite future time at which time they will presumably be denied the opportunity to observe endangered animals do not suffice for they do not demonstrate an imminent injury Respondents also mistakenly rely on a number of other novel standing theories Their theory that any person using any part of a contiguous ecosystem adversely affected by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is located far away from the area of their use is inconsistent with this Court s opinion in Lujan v National Wildlife Federation 497 U S 871 And they state purely speculative nonconcrete injuries when they argue that suit can be brought by anyone with an interest in studying or seeing endangered animals anywhere on the globe and

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0504_0555_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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