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  • Powers v. Ohio
    and unbiased persons from the petit jury solely by reason of their race See e g Batson supra at 84 Holland v Illinois 493 U S 474 Contrary to Ohio s contention racial identity between the objecting defendant and the excluded jurors does not constitute a relevant precondition for a Batson challenge and would in fact contravene the substantive guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause and the policies underlying federal statutory law Although Batson did involve such an identity it recognized that the State s discriminatory use of peremptories harms the excluded jurors by depriving them of a significant opportunity to participate in civil life 476 U S at 87 Moreover the discriminatory selection of jurors has been the subject of a federal criminal prohibition since Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1875 Thus although an individual juror does not have the right to sit on any particular petit jury he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race This Court rejects as contrary to accepted equal protection principles the arguments that no particular stigma or dishonor results if a prosecutor uses the raw fact of skin color to determine a juror s objectivity or qualifications see Batson supra at 87 and that race based p401 peremptory challenges are permissible when visited upon members of all races in equal degree see Loving v Virginia 388 U S 1 Pp 410 416 b A criminal defendant has standing to raise the third party equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the prosecution because of their race Cf e g Singleton v Wulff 428 U S 106 112 116 First the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges causes the defendant cognizable injury and he or she has a concrete interest in challenging the practice

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0499_0400_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
    to a jury trial and the Superior Court released the transcript After holding that the controversy was not moot the Court of Appeal denied the writ The California Supreme Court also denied the writ holding that there is no general First Amendment right of access to preliminary hearings and that under the California statute if the defendant establishes a reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice the burden shifts to the prosecution or the media to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there is no such reasonable probability of prejudice p2 Held 1 Even though the Superior Court ultimately released the transcript in question the case is not moot because the controversy is capable of repetition yet evading review Globe Newspaper Co v Superior Court 457 U S 596 457 U S 596 457 U S 596 Gannett Co v DePasquale 443 U S 368 Thus this Court has jurisdiction P 6 2 The qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary hearings as conducted in California First there has been a tradition of public accessibility to preliminary hearings of the type conducted in California As opposed to grand jury proceedings preliminary hearings conducted before neutral and detached magistrates have been open to the public Second public access to such preliminary hearings is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system This proper functioning is not made any less essential by the fact that a preliminary hearing cannot result in a conviction and the adjudication is before a magistrate without a jury The absence of a jury makes the importance of public access even more significant Pp 6 13 3 Since a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches to preliminary hearings as conducted in California the proceedings cannot be closed unless specific on

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0478_0001_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
    would have made the same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive Here petitioner may not meet its burden by merely showing that respondent s interpersonal problems abrasiveness with staff members constituted a legitimate reason for denying her partnership instead petitioner must show that its legitimate reason standing alone would have induced petitioner to deny respondent partnership Pp 239 252 b Conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII cases and one of these rules is that the parties need only prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence Pp 252 255 c The District Court s finding that sex stereotyping was permitted to play a part in evaluating respondent as a candidate for partnership was not clearly erroneous This finding is not undermined by the fact that many of the suspect comments made about respondent were made by partners who were supporters rather than detractors Pp 255 258 JUSTICE WHITE although concluding that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the improper motive rather than merely requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence as in Mt Healthy City Bd of Ed v Doyle 429 U S 274 which sets forth the proper approach to causation in this case also concluded that the plurality here errs in seeming to require at least in most cases that the employer carry its burden by submitting objective evidence that the same result would have occurred absent the unlawful motivation In a mixed motives case where the legitimate motive found would have been ample grounds for the action taken and the employer credibly testifies that the action would have been taken for the legitimate reasons alone this should be ample proof and there is no special requirement of objective evidence This would even more plainly be the case where the employer denies any illegitimate motive in the first place but the court finds that illegitimate as well as legitimate factors motivated the adverse action Pp 258 261 JUSTICE O CONNOR although agreeing that on the facts of this case the burden of persuasion should shift to petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision absent consideration of respondent s gender and that this burden shift is properly part of the liability phase of the litigation concluded that the plurality misreads Title VII s substantive causation requirement to command burden shifting if the employer s decisional process is p230 tainted by awareness of sex or race in any way and thereby effectively eliminates the requirement JUSTICE O CONNOR also concluded that the burden shifting rule should be limited to cases such as the present in which the employer has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight to an impermissible criterion Pp 261 279 a Contrary to the plurality s conclusion Title VII s plain language making it

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0490_0228_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Printz v. United States
    of these statements necessarily implies what is the critical point here that Congress could impose these responsibilities without the States consent They appear to rest on the natural assumption that the States would consent see FERC v Mississippi 456 U S 742 796 n 35 O Connor J concurring in judgment and dissenting in part Finally there is an absence of executive commandeering federal statutes in the country s later history at least until very recent years Even assuming that newer laws represent an assertion of the congressional power challenged here they are of such recent vintage that they are not probative of a constitutional tradition Pp 4 18 c The Constitution s structure reveals a principle that controls these cases the system of dual sovereignty See e g Gregory v Ashcroft 501 U S 452 457 Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government they retained a residuary and inviolable sovereignty that is reflected throughout the Constitution s text See e g Lane County v Oregon 7 Wall 71 76 The Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the States and instead designed a system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people The Federal Government s power would be augmented immeasurably and impermissibly if it were able to impress into its service and at no cost to itself the police officers of the 50 States Pp 18 22 d Federal control of state officers would also have an effect upon the separation and equilibration of powers between the three branches of the Federal Government itself The Brady Act effectively transfers the President s responsibility to administer the laws enacted by Congress Art II 2 and 3 to thousands of CLEOs in the 50 States who are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control The Federal Executive s unity would be shattered and the power of the President would be subject to reduction if Congress could simply require state officers to execute its laws Pp 22 23 e Contrary to the dissent s contention the Brady Act s direction of the actions of state executive officials is not constitutionally valid under Art I 8 as a law necessary and proper to the execution of Congress s Commerce Clause power to regulate handgun sales Where as here a law violates the state sovereignty principle it is not a law proper for carrying into Execution delegated powers within the Necessary and Proper Clause s meaning Cf New York v United States 505 U S 144 166 The Supremacy Clause does not help the dissent since it makes Law of the Land only Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance of the Constitution Art VI cl 2 Pp 24 25 f Finally and most conclusively in these cases the Court s jurisprudence makes clear that the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0521_0898_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Prize Cases
    are liable to be treated as enemies though not foreigners 10 It is a settled rule that a vessel in a blockaded port is presumed to have notice of a blockade as soon as it commences 11 The proclamation of blockade having allowed fifteen days for neutrals to leave a vessel which overstays the time is liable to capture although she was prevented by accident from getting out sooner 12 To make a capture lawful it is not necessary that a warning of the blockade should have been previously endorsed on the register of the captured vessel These were cases in which the vessels named together with their cargoes were severally captured and brought in as prizes by public ships of the United States The libels were filed by p637 the proper District Attorneys on behalf of the United States and on behalf of the officers and crews of the ships by which the captures were respectively made In each case the District Court pronounced a decree of condemnation from which the claimants took an appeal The Amy Warwick was a merchant vessel and belonged to Richmond Her registered owners were David and William Currie Abraham Warwick and George W Allen who resided at that place Previous to her capture she had made a voyage from New York to Richmond and thence to Rio de Janeiro Brazil At the last named port she shipped a cargo of coffee 5 100 bags to be delivered at New York Philadelphia Baltimore or Richmond according to the orders which the master would receive at Hampton Roads She was on her voyage from Rio to Hampton Roads and off Cape Henry when she was captured July 10th 1861 by the Quaker City At the time of the capture the barque was sailing under American colors and her commander was ignorant of the war The Quaker City carried her into Boston where she was libelled as enemy s property The claimants of the vessel were the persons already named as owners James Dunlap Robert Edmonds John L Phipps and Charles Brown claimed the cargo The claimants in their several answers denied any hostility on their part to the Government or Laws of the United States averred that the master was ignorant of any blockade embargo or other interdiction of commerce with the ports of Virginia and asserted generally that the capture was unlawful The Crenshaw was captured by the United States Steamer Star at the mouth of James River on the 17th of May 1861 She was bound for Liverpool with a cargo of tobacco from Richmond and was owned by David and William Currie who admitted the existence of an insurrection in Virginia against the Laws and Government of the United States but averred that they were innocent of it The claimants of the cargo made similar answers and all the claimants asserted that they had no such notice of the blockade as rendered the vessel or cargo liable to seizure for leaving the

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0067_0635_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Proffitt v. Florida
    and Fourteenth Amendment s Gregg ante at 168 187 P 247 2 On its face the Florida procedures for imposition of the death penalty satisfy the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman supra Florida trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to assist them in deciding whether to impose a death penalty or imprisonment for life and their decisions are reviewed to ensure that they comport with other sentences imposed under similar circumstances Petitioner s contentions that the new Florida procedures remain arbitrary and capricious lack merit Pp 251 259 a The argument that the Florida system is constitutionally invalid because it allows discretion to be exercised at each stage of the criminal proceeding fundamentally misinterprets Furman Gregg ante at 199 P 254 p243 b The aggravating circumstances authorizing the death penalty if the crime is especially heinous atrocious or cruel or if t he defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons as construed by the Florida Supreme Court provide adequate guidance to those involved in the sentencing process and as thus construed are not overly broad Pp 255 256 c Petitioner s argument that the imprecision of the mitigating circumstances makes them incapable of determination by a judge or jury and other contentions in a similar vein raise questions about line drawing evaluations that do not differ from factors that juries and judges traditionally consider The Florida statute gives clear and precise directions to judge and jury to enable them to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating ones Pp 257 258 d Contrary to petitioner s contention the State Supreme Court s review role is neither ineffective nor arbitrary as evidenced by the careful procedures it has followed in assessing the imposition of death sentences over a third of which that court has vacated Pp 258

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0428_0242_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge
    any power of the State is said to be surrendered or diminished whether it be the taxing power or any other affecting the public interest the same principle applies and the rule of construction must be the same No one will question that the interests of the great body of the people of the State would in this instance be affected by the surrender of this great line of travel to a single corporation with the right to exact toll and exclude competition for seventy years While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded we must not forget that the community also have rights and that the happiness and wellbeing of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation The act of incorporation of the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge is in the usual form and the privileges such as are commonly given to corporations of that kind It confers on them the ordinary faculties of a corporation for the purpose of building the bridge and establishes certain rates of toll which the company is authorized to take This is the whole grant There is no exclusive privilege given to them over the waters of Charles River above or below their bridge no right to erect another bridge themselves nor to prevent other persons from erecting one no engagement from the State that another shall not be erected and no undertaking not to sanction competition nor to make improvements that may p423 diminish the amount of its income Upon all these subjects the charter is silent and nothing is said in it about a line of travel so much insisted on in the argument in which they are to have exclusive privileges No words are used from which an intention to grant any of these rights can be inferred If the plaintiffs are entitled to them it must be implied simply from the nature of the grant and cannot be inferred from the words by which the grant is made Amid the multitude of cases which have occurred and have been daily occurring for the last forty or fifty years this is the first instance in which such an implied contract has been contended for and this Court is called upon to infer it from an ordinary act of incorporation containing nothing more than the usual stipulations and provisions to be found in every such law The absence of any such controversy where there must have been so many occasions to give rise to it proves that neither States nor individuals nor corporations ever imagined that such a contract can be implied from such charters It shows that the men who voted for these laws never imagined that they were forming such a contract and if it is maintained that they have made it it must be by a legal fiction in opposition to the truth of the fact and the obvious intention of the party The Court cannot deal thus with the rights reserved to the States and by legal intendments and mere technical reasoning take away from them any portion of that power over their own internal police and improvement which is so necessary to their wellbeing and prosperity Let it once be understood that such charters carry with them these implied contracts and give this unknown and undefined property in a line of traveling and you will soon find the old turnpike corporations awakening from their sleep and calling upon this Court to put down the improvements which have taken their place The millions of property which have been invested in railroads and canals upon lines of travel which had been before occupied by turnpike corporations will be put in jeopardy We shall be thrown back to the improvements of the last century and be obliged to stand still until the claims of the old turnpike corporations shall be satisfied and they shall consent to permit these States to avail themselves of the lights of modern science and to partake of the benefit of those improvements which are now adding to the wealth and prosperity and the convenience and comfort of every other part of the civilized world In error to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts The plaintiffs in error were a corporation created by an act of the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts passed on the 9th of March 1785 entitled an act for incorporating certain persons for the purpose of building a bridge over Charles River between Boston and Charlestown and supporting the same during forty years The preamble of the act stated whereas the erecting a bridge over Charles River in the place where the ferry between Boston and Charlestown is now kept will be of great public utility and Thomas Russell Esq and others have petitioned this court for an act of incorporation to empower them to build the same bridge c The act authorizes taking certain tolls prescribed the size of the p424 bridge and fixed certain regulations by which it would not be permitted to impede the navigation of Charles River and enjoined certain things to be done by which the bridge should be kept in good order and fitted for constant and convenient use The fifth section of the act provided that after the said toll shall commence the said proprietors or corporation shall annually pay to Harvard College or University the sum of two hundred pounds during the said term of forty years and at the end of the said term the said bridge shall revert to and be the property of the Commonwealth saving to the said college or university a reasonable and annual compensation for the annual income of the ferry which they might have received had not said bridge been erected The bridge was erected under the authority of this act and afterwards on the 9th of March 1792 in an act which authorized the making a bridge from the western part of Boston to Cambridge after reciting that the erecting of Charles

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0036_0420_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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  • Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins
    speech and petitioning reasonably exercised in shopping centers even when the center is privately owned and that such result does not infringe appellants property rights protected by the Federal Constitution Held 1 This case is properly before this Court as an appeal under 28 U S C 1257 2 A state constitutional provision is a statute within the meaning of 1257 2 and in deciding that the State Constitution gave appellees the right to solicit signatures on appellants property the California Supreme Court rejected appellants claim that recognition of such a right violated their right to exclude others a fundamental component of their federally protected property rights Pp 79 80 2 State constitutional provisions as construed to permit individuals reasonably to exercise free speech and petition rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center to which the public is invited do not violate the shopping center owner s property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment s or his free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment s Pp 88 a The reasoning in Lloyd Corp v Tanner 407 U S 551 which p75 held that the First Amendment does not prevent a private shopping center owner from prohibiting the distribution on center premises of handbills unrelated to the center s operations does not ex proprio vigore limit a State s authority to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution And a State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking without just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional provision Pp 80 81 b The requirement that appellants permit appellees to exercise state protected rights of free expression and petition on shopping center property does not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants property rights under the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment appellants having failed to demonstrate that the right to exclude others is so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the state authorized limitation of it amounted to a taking Kaiser Aetna v United States 444 U S 164 distinguished And there is no merit to appellants argument that they have been denied property without due process of law where they have failed to show that the due process test whereby the challenged law must not be unreasonable arbitrary or capricious and the means selected must have a real and substantial relation to the objective to be obtained is not satisfied by the State s asserted interest in promoting more expansive rights of free speech and petition than conferred by the Federal Constitution Pp 82 85 c Nor have appellants First Amendment rights been infringed by the California Supreme Court s decision The shopping center by choice of its owner is not limited to the personal use of appellants and the views expressed by

    Original URL path: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0447_0074_ZS.html (2012-11-09)
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