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  • Contact — Department of Economics
    Barry W Ickes Interim Director of Graduate Studies E mail bwickes psu edu Site Navigation University Park Campus Photos Downtown State College State College Area Schools State College Area Communities Housing in State College You are here Home Graduate Contact Contact Department of Economics Barry W Ickes Interim Director of Graduate Studies E mail bwickes psu edu Krista Winkelblech Graduate Office Secretary Phone 814 865 1458 E mail kfg106 psu

    Original URL path: http://www.econ.psu.edu/graduate/contact (2015-07-10)
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  • Prior Candidacy Exams — Department of Economics
    International Students Prior Candidacy Exams Spring Fall Job Market Candidates Initial placements of Ph D Graduates Graduate Student Association Centers Center for the Study of Auctions Procurements and Competition Policy Center for Research on International Financial and Energy Security Questions Barry W Ickes Interim Director of Graduate Studies E mail bwickes psu edu Site Navigation University Park Campus Photos Downtown State College State College Area Schools State College Area Communities

    Original URL path: http://www.econ.psu.edu/graduate/prior-candidacy-exams (2015-07-10)
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  • Ph.D. Job Market Placement Director Marc Henry, (814) 865-0010, muh24@psu.edu — Department of Economics
    Fakos Alexandros Kucheryavyy Konstantin Luo Rong Nozawa Wataru Shin Wiroy Sultanum Bruno Yang Hoonsik Initial placements of Ph D Graduates Graduate Student Association Centers Center for the Study of Auctions Procurements and Competition Policy Center for Research on International Financial and Energy Security Questions Barry W Ickes Interim Director of Graduate Studies E mail bwickes psu edu Site Navigation University Park Campus Photos Downtown State College State College Area Schools

    Original URL path: http://www.econ.psu.edu/graduate/job-market-candidates/2014-2015-new-ph-d-job-market-candidates-coming-soon (2015-07-10)
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  • Awaya, Yu — Department of Economics
    Example joint with Hiroki Fukai revision required by Macroeconomic Dynamics On Tacit versus Explicit Collusion job market paper joint with Vijay Krishna submitted Private Monitoring and Communication in Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma submitted Money is not Memory joint with Hiroki Fukai submitted Repeated Games with Myopic Players An Example with Discontinuous Payoff Correspondence Reputation and Search Cooperation without Monitoring Grants Fellowships Bates White Fellowship Spring 2013 Teaching Experience TA of Intermediate Micro 2009 2014 Research Experience RA for Vijay Krishna Fall 2014 Work Experience Referee Service International Journal of Economic Theory Presentations 2013 The 24th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory Stony Brook 2013 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society National University of Singapore 2013 Cornell PSU Macro Workshop Cornell University References Vijay Krishna Advisor vkrishna psu edu Kalyan Chatterjee kchatterjee psu edu Neil Wallace nxw9 psu edu Thesis Abstract THESIS ABSTRACT Essay 1 On Tacit versus Explicit Collusion job market paper joint with Vijay Krishna Antitrust law makes a sharp distinction between tacit and explicit collusion In the former there is no communication between firms whereas in the latter there is Tacit collusion is legal whereas explicit collusion is illegal even criminal The theory of repeated games the standard framework for studying collusion does not however provide a justification for this distinction In most models communication does not enlarge the set of equilibria Precisely in repeated games with perfect monitoring past actions are perfectly observable for any fixed discount rate the set of perfect equilibrium payoffs with and without communication is the same In repeated games with noisy public monitoring an aggregate of past actions is commonly observed the set of public perfect equilibrium payoffs in the two settings is also the same In this paper we study this issue in Stigler s 1964 model of secret price cutting which is a repeated game with noisy private monitoring Firms cannot observe each other s prices nor can they observe each other s sales Each firm only observes its own sales and these are noisy signals of the other firms actions For a fixed discount factor we identify conditions on the monitoring structure the stochastic relationship between prices and sales under which there are equilibria under explicit collusion that result in near monopoly profits whereas all equilibria under tacit collusion are bounded away from this outcome In our model explicit collusion takes place via the exchange of sales reports These reports even though unverifiable lead to better monitoring and so result in higher prices and profits The conditions we identify are that the monitoring structure be noisy but correlated Moreover how correlated firms sales are depends on how close their prices are In order to establish this result the paper develops a general method of bounding the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring without communication We emphasize that our results are for a fixed discount factor in contrast to the so called folk theorems as in Sugaya 2012 Essay 2 Private Monitoring and Communication in

    Original URL path: http://www.econ.psu.edu/graduate/job-market-candidates/yu-awaya (2015-07-10)
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  • Chen, Chun-Ting — Department of Economics
    Thesis Title Essays on Communication Coordination and Correlation Thesis Advisor Kalyan Chatterjee Primary Fields Microeconomic Theory Game Theory Papers Coordination in Social Networks Job Market Paper A Window of Cognition Eyetracking the Reasoning Process in Spatial Beauty Contest Games with Chen Ying Huang Joseph Tao Yi Wang Work in Progress Correlation with Unduplicable Messages Mechanism for Borrowing and Lending with Rakesh Chaturvedi Grants Fellowships Graduate Assistantship Department of Economics The Pennsylvania State University 2009 2014 The Best Master Thesis Award Taiwan Economics Association 2008 Teaching Experience Teaching Assistant to Professor Peter Newberry Industrial Organization ECON 444 for advanced undergraduate 2013 Research Experience Research Assistant to Professor Kalyan Chatterjee 2014 summer Research Assistant to Professor Adam Slawski 2012 summer Research Assistant to Professor Chen Ying Huang 2008 2009 Presentations ESA 2008 International Meeting 2008 References Professor Kalyan Chatterjee Chair Email kchatterjee psu edu Phone 814 865 6050 Department of Economics The Pennsylvania State University Professor James Jordan Email jxj13 psu edu Phone 814 865 2201 Department of Economics The Pennsylvania State University Professor Edward Green Email eug2 psu edu Phone 814 865 8493 Department of Economics The Pennsylvania State University Thesis Abstract Coordination in Social Networks Job Market Paper This paper studies a collective action problem in a setting of discounted repeated coordination games where information and monitoring structures are modeled as networks Players only know their neighbors types that describe the neighbors inclination to participate in a collective action as well as monitor their neighbors past actions I ask what kinds of networks can induce people to solve the uncertainty about players inclination and coordinate to the ex post efficient outcome In order to coordinate to the ex post efficient outcome players need to communicate by their actions and there should be routes for players to communicate I define strong

    Original URL path: http://www.econ.psu.edu/graduate/job-market-candidates/chunting-chen (2015-07-10)
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  • Davoodalhoseini, S. Mohammad R. — Department of Economics
    Fields Mechanism Design Papers Working Papers Constrained Efficiency with Search and Information Frictions Directed Search with Complementarity and Adverse Selection Directed Search toward Heterogeneously Informed Buyers Grants Fellowships Sharif Award for the highest GPA among Graduate students in Economics and Management sciences Sharif University of Technology 2009 National Foundation of Elites Fellowship Iran 2007 2009 Ranked third among 450 000 participants in the nationwide university entrance exam Iran 2003 Teaching Experience Instructor ECON 351 Money and Banking Undergraduate Summer 2013 and Summer 2014 Teaching Assistant ECON 102 Introductory Microeconomic Analysis ECON 104 Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis ECON 302 Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis ECON 304 Intermediate Macroeconomic Analysis Research Experience Research Assistant for Prof Shouyong Shi 2014 Professional Activities ECONCON Conference Princeton University 2012 Cornell Penn State Macroeconomics workshop Fall 2014 Midwest Economic Theory Conference Fall 2014 Southwest Search and Matching group Scheduled for Nov 2014 Invited References Neil Wallace Pennsylvania State University Phone 814 863 3805 Email neilw psu edu Shouyong Shi Pennsylvania State University Phone 814 865 2745 Email sus67 psu edu Manolis Galenianous Royal Holloway University of London Phone 44 1784276 390 Email manolis galenianos rhul ac uk Conferences Attended ECONCON Conference Princeton University 2012 Cornell Penn State Macroeconomics workshop Fall 2014 Midwest Economic Theory Conference Fall 2014 South West Search and Matching group Fall 2014 Invited Thesis Abstract THESIS ABSTRACT Constrained Efficiency with Search and Information Frictions Job Market Paper I characterize the constrained efficient or planner s allocation in a directed search model with adverse selection Guerrieri Shimer and Wright 2010 analyze equilibrium in this environment and show through three examples that the equilibrium is Pareto dominated by some pooling or semi pooling allocations I formally define a planner whose objective is to maximize social welfare subject to the information and matching frictions of the environment The planner can impose taxes and subsidies on agents that vary across sub markets while being subject to an overall budget balance condition The special case of no such taxes and transfers is the equilibrium in Guerrieri et al 2010 I show that if the equilibrium is not first best efficient then the equilibrium is not constrained efficient I also derive conditions under which the planner can achieve the first best I present examples in the context of financial and labor markets explicitly solve for the efficient tax and transfer schemes and compare the planner s allocation with the equilibrium allocation Directed Search with Complementarity and Adverse Selection 2014 I study a model in which firms invest in capital and post wages and heterogeneous workers who have private information about their skills choose where to apply Workers and firms match bilaterally Each matched agent gets an exogenous payoff from the match before wages are paid Each of these payoffs displays complementarity in capital and skill I derive conditions under which the market exhibits positive assortative matching Interestingly under the same conditions the matching under complete information which has been studied by Shi 2001 might not be positive assortative I also show that

    Original URL path: http://www.econ.psu.edu/graduate/job-market-candidates/sayad-mohammad-davoodalhoseini (2015-07-10)
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  • Fakos, Alexandros — Department of Economics
    321 7498 Email alexandrosfakos gmail com Website http alexfakos weebly com Curriculum Vitae Citizenship Greece F1 visa Education Ph D in Economics The Pennsylvania State University Expected Summer 2015 M Sc in Economics Athens University of Economics and Business March 2009 summa cum laude Valedictorian B A in Economics Athens University of Economics and Business November 2007 summa cum laude Ph D Thesis Title Evaluating an Investment Subsidy Policy through a Structural Econometric Model using Micro data from Greece Thesis Advisor Mark Roberts Primary Fields Applied Microeconomics Secondary Fields Applied Econometrics Industrial Organization Papers Evaluating an Investment Subsidy Policy through a Structural Econometric Model using Micro data from Greece November 2014 Job Market Paper The Properties of Diffusion of an Automated Technology and its Effects on Labor Demand and Productivity Evidence from the US Postal Service 2012 Grants Fellowships University Graduate Fellowship The Pennsylvania State University 2009 George and Victoria Karelias Foundation 2009 Prof Charalambos Sepentzis Foundation 2009 Greek Scholarship Foundation 2003 Teaching Experience Teaching Assistant ECON 433 Advanced International Trade Fall 2010 Spring 2011 Fall 2011 Spring 2012 ECON 447 Sports Economics Fall 2013 ECON 451 Monetary Theory and Policy Fall 2012 Spring 2013 Spring 2014 Research Experience Research Assistant for Prof Paul L E Grieco Summer 2010 Summer 2011 Presentations Applied Economics Working Group The Pennsylvania State University 2014 Applied Micro brown bag seminar The Pennsylvania State University 2014 References Mark J Roberts chair Department of Economics The Pennsylvania State University Phone 814 863 1535 Email mroberts psu edu Stephen Ross Yeaple Department of Economics The Pennsylvania State University Phone 814 865 5452 Email sry3 psu edu Paul L E Grieco Department of Economics The Pennsylvania State University Phone 814 867 3310 Email plg15 psu edu Thesis Abstract https alexfakos weebly com research html This paper studies the

    Original URL path: http://www.econ.psu.edu/graduate/job-market-candidates/alexander-fakos (2015-07-10)
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  • Kucheryavyy, Konstantin — Department of Economics
    Risk Sharing Together at Last Thesis Advisor Jonathan Eaton Stephen Yeaple Primary Fields International Finance International Trade Secondary Fields Computational Economics Papers Working Papers Comparative Advantage and International Risk Sharing Together at Last job market paper October 2014 External Economies and International Trade A Quantitative Framework with Gary Lyn and Andrés Rodríguez Clare October 2014 Work in Progress External Economies and International Trade Multiple Equilibria Industrial Policy and Gains from Trade with Gary Lyn and Andrés Rodríguez Clare July 2014 Additive Trade Costs in a Ricardian Model of Trade A Quantitative Analysis with Ahmad Lashkaripour A Simulation Based Toolbox for Solving High Dimensional Dynamic Models with Bulat Gafarov Published Papers Continuity of a Model with a Nested CES Utility Function and Bertrand Competition in Economics Letters November 2012 Honors and Awards Rosenberg Award Penn State University 2013 Graduate Assistantship Penn State University 2009 present Schlumberger scholarship Novosibirsk State University 2005 2007 Teaching Experience International Finance NES Summer School at Penn State University Instructor Undergraduate Level July 2013 Intermediate Macroeconomics New Economic School Russia Teaching Assistant Graduate Level January June 2009 Distributed Systems Engineering Novosibirsk State University Russia Lecturer at the Department of Information Technologies Undergraduate Level February June 2007 Informatics Novosibirsk State University Russia Lecturer at the Department of Law Undergraduate Level February June 2006 February June 2007 Mathematics Novosibirsk State University Russia Teaching Assistant at the Department of Law Undergraduate Level September December 2005 September December 2006 Research Experience Research Assistant at the Center for Research on International Financial and Energy Security Director Barry Ickes August 2010 present Research Assistant for Costas Arkolakis and Manolis Galenianos Summer 2013 Research Assistant for Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum Summer 2012 Research Assistant for Kala Krishna Summer 2011 Presentations Presentations Graduate Student Conference in Economics at Washington University in St Louis October 2014 Midwest Economic Theory and International Trade Meetings October 2014 International Trade Lunch at Yale University September 2014 Macro Lunch Talk at Penn State University September 2014 Initiative for Computational Economics at Stanford University July 2013 July 2014 Participation Initiative for Computational Economics at Stanford University 2013 2014 Initiative for Computational Economics at the University of Chicago 2012 Duke Center for the History of Political Economy Summer Institute 2012 References Russell Cooper Department of Economics Pennsylvania State University Phone 814 863 2158 E mail rwc165 psu edu Jonathan Eaton co chair Department of Economics Brown University Phone 401 863 2118 E mail jonathan eaton brown edu Andrés Rodríguez Clare Department of Economics University of California Berkeley Phone 510 643 1654 E mail andres econ berkeley edu Stephen Yeaple co chair Department of Economics Pennsylvania State University Phone 814 865 5452 E mail sry3 psu edu Thesis Abstract Comparative Advantage and International Risk Sharing Together at Last job market paper The overwhelming consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature appears to be that access to international risk sharing in the presence of uninsured TFP shocks induces a country to specialize more in its comparative advantage industries This paper demonstrates that the

    Original URL path: http://www.econ.psu.edu/graduate/job-market-candidates/konstantin-kucheryavyy (2015-07-10)
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