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  • Knowledgebase-Alcoholic Beverages On Premises Consumption
    license holder Alcoholic beverages may not be sold to persons under the age of twenty one 21 and may not be sold by persons under the age of eighteen 18 Persons selling or serving alcoholic beverages must have a permit from the ABC Alcoholic beverages may not be sold between the hours of 3 00 a m and 8 00 a m during Monday through Saturday and may not be sold on Sundays between the hours of 3 00 a m and 12 00 noon Beer sale hours must coincide with the hours of sale for alcoholic beverages as regulated by the ABC regardless of any ordinance to the contrary The City of Clinton is authorized under Tennessee Code Annotated 57 4 301 to levy a privilege tax on private clubs restaurants and other establishments that sell alcoholic beverages for on premise consumption see attached list of permit fees This levy is collected by the City A gross receipts tax of fifteen 15 percent is levied by the State of Tennessee on all alcoholic beverages sold for consumption on the premises This fee is collected by the State Department of Revenue on a monthly basis and is distributed as follows I Fifty percent 50 for education State II Fifty percent 50 to the local political jurisdiction The local amount is further allocated with fifty percent 50 to education and fifty percent 50 to the City General Fund This distribution provides that seventy five percent 75 of the on premise consumption gross receipts tax goes to education In addition to the privilege tax and gross receipts tax your City may impose by ordinance an inspection fee upon licensed retailers of alcoholic beverages The fee shall not exceed eight percent 8 of the wholesale price of alcoholic beverages supplied by a wholesaler

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/c7c356433665ae8785256b3c0057b6c0?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Alcoholic Beverages Ordinances
    Original Author Darden Ron Co Author Product Create Date 02 11 2002 Last Reviewed on 03 01 2006 Subject Alcoholic beverages Alcoholic beverages Laws and regulations Beer Beer Laws and regulations Type Ordinance Original Document Reference Documents Text of Document Please remember that this ordinance was drafted based upon the drafting requirements and authority granted to a particular city or town in its charter and in general law These drafting

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/e45ea980aea5020f85256b6b004d2309?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Alcoholic Beverages Questions Related to Residency Requirements
    Residency Requirements Summary MTAS was asked about the petition residency requirements for a local option election for liquor sales and whether a person obtaining an alcoholic beverage license from the state is required to be a Tennessee resident Original Author Broughton Jeff Co Author Jones Josh Product Create Date 04 06 2014 Last Reviewed on 04 28 2014 Subject Alcoholic beverages Laws and regulations Alcoholic beverages Licenses and permits Elections

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/bffa39853f47d88c85257cc800673c26?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Alcoholic Beverages Sold Near Residential Property
    word residential refers to the use made of the property by its occupants and does not preclude the construction and rental of duplexes apartments houses or condominiums The Court reasoned that it could not determine the intent of the parties in interpreting the phrase residential purposes only and turned to the plain meaning of the phrase reaching to 14 A L R2d 1376 and several cases from other jurisdictions for support In doing so it simply apparently assumed that the definition of residence in the context of a restrictive covenant was property upon which a person or persons lived The Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion In Jernigan v Capps 45 S E 2d 886 1948 The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia said It is not necessary that we go to a dictionary or a law book to ascertain the meaning of a residential building Giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning we would say that such a building is one which is used for residential purposes that is one in which people reside or dwell or in which they make their homes as distinguished from one which is used for commercial or business purposes But if the obvious must be supported by authority or judicial precedent we find that they are of the same view Webster s New International Dictionary 2d Ed defines residential as Used serving or designed as a residence or for occupation by residents as a residential hotel Adapted to or occupied by residences as a residential quarter Of pertaining to or connected with residence or residences as residential trade qualifications or zones Of or pertaining to a resident The same authority defines residence as The place where one actually lives or has his home a person s dwelling place or place of habitation and abode The house where one s home is a dwelling house Citation omitted At 890 Although that case also involved a restrictive covenants its definition of residential building is of general application It seems clear to me that Tennessee Code Annotated 57 5 105 i also uses the term residential dwelling in a manner broad enough to include a vacant residential dwelling It is extremely doubtful that the General Assembly intended for Tennessee Code Annotated 57 5 105 i to be read so narrowly as to exclude any residential dwelling that was unoccupied merely because its owner had died or was for any reason temporarily vacant It is logical to me that they would interpret that statute in the same manner that they interpret Tennessee s Pre Existing Non Conforming Use Law Found at Tennessee Code Annotated 13 7 208 that Law protects pre existing non conforming businesses from the application of new zoning laws or zoning changes that would make the present use of the property illegal Obviously that law does not apply to the residential dwelling in your case but the cases that deal with the question of the status of vacant property under

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/d5929e5b07c36c6f85256b6e004db057?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Alderman's Use of Appointing Power
    an appointing power to use such power as a means of conferring an office upon himself and declared that We concur in both of the conclusions reached as above by the Supreme Court of Oregon and consequently feel constrained to hold that Hornung s vote for himself for the office of county superintendent was contrary to public policy and for that reason an utterly illegal vote At 154 New Jersey A member of a city council could not vote to accept his own resignation in Steven ex rel Kuberski v Haussermann 172 A 738 N J 1934 because Generally public policy forbids the participation of a member of a municipal governing body in any matter before it which directly or immediately affects him individually Considerations of public police require the acceptance of a resignation to make it effective This requirement is designed to safeguard the public interest and it follows as a necessary consequence that the officer tendering his resignation cannot participate in the proceedings or action taken thereon In the clash of interests those of the public and the officer who seeks to resign his post the action to be taken must be determined by a disinterested body At 741 Citing Haussermann and a number of other New Jersey cases the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the mayor could not vote for himself to become a member of the city s water commission in Grimes v Miller 175 A 152 N J 1934 on the ground that the mayor was disqualified from participation in his own election because of his self interest That was true said the Court even in the absence of a statutory prohibition on self voting A member of a city council could not vote for himself to become a member of a joint sewer commission of which several cities were a part in Hazlet Township Committee v Morales 289 A 2d 563 N J Law Div 1972 Under New Jersey law the member of the city council was authorized to be appointed a member of the joint sewer commission however he could not vote to appoint himself to that position The Court reasoned that a municipal official in such a situation was not likely to act purely out of undivided loyalty to the public But a New Jersey court created an exception in Skarbnik v Spina 308 A 2d 390 N J Law Div 1973 At a meeting of the city council in that case two self votes occurred Bonnet voting for himself was elected council president Emphasis is mine Spina voting for himself was elected the city council representative to the joint sewer authority Without their self votes Bonnet and Spina would not have been elected to their respective offices However their votes were valid for three reasons held the Court 1 In Hazlet the statute permitted rather than required the appointment to the sewer authority to be made from among the members of the city council However the statute governing election to the office of council president and the statute governing the election to the joint sewer authority both required the election to those offices be made from the members of the city council 2 Disallowing their vote would produce a result not within the letter or spirit of the law governing the council s voting procedure The city had a five person council consisting of a mayor and four council members Under the city council s rules of procedure three council members constituted a quorum and appointments to the council required a majority vote However if Bonnet and Spina were not permitted to vote their election in either situation would require the affirmative vote of not the majority as legislated but rather of at least three of the four councilmen remaining In effect this could mean that for any such nominee to be elected or appointed at least four of the five councilmen three in addition to the nominee would have to favor the election or appointment This suggested requirement is not within the letter or spirit of the applicable statute citation omitted and the local rules of procedure adopted thereto At 395 3 There was no showing that either of the defendant councilmen was at the time of voting subject to any direct or indirect private interest at variance with the impartial performance of his public duty Emphasis is the court s The Court reached that conclusion by looking at Robert s Rules of Order Newly Revised RRONR Under RRONR Section 44 ABSTAINING FROM VOTING ON A QUESTION OF DIRECT PERSONAL INTEREST No member should vote on a question in which he has a direct personal or pecuniary interest not common to other members of the organization For example if a motion proposes that the organization enter into a contract with a commercial firm of which a member of the organization is an officer and from which contract he would derive personal pecuniary profit the member should abstain from voting on the motion VOTING ON QUESTIONS AFFECTING ONESELF The rule on abstaining from voting on a question of direct personal interest does not mean that a member is prevented from voting for himself for an office or position to which members generally are eligible nor from voting when other members are included with him in a motion If a member could never vote on a question affecting himself it would be impossible for a society to vote to hold a banquet or for the majority to prevent a small minority from preferring charges against them and suspending or expelling them At RRONR 345 At 396 With respect to those provisions concluded the Court Each of the councilmen is eligible to either office Accordingly the interest of any one of them in either office is common to other members of the council and any one of them is no more disqualified thereby from voting for himself than are the others from voting against him At 396 In Kurz v Genova 343

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/345073834c876c1985256bff0050583b?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Alderman Appointed Commissioners over Departments of the City
    consent of the City Council Such authority is implicit in and merely part of the broad authority granted to the mayor by 11 43 81 to supervise and control the affairs of the city The addition by the court of that italicized language is significant for Alabama Statute 11 43 81 actually read The mayor shall be the chief executive officer and shall have general supervision and control of all other officers and affairs of the city or town except as otherwise provided by this title He shall have the power to appoint all officers whose appointment is not otherwise provided in this title The major problem the city had in this case was that it could not point to any other statute in that title that put the appointment power over the mayors personal secretary in the city councils hands For that reason that case can be confusing and misleading Still the cases can be read for the proposition that board authority can be implied from the mayors power of general supervision of all other officers and affairs of the city or town The remaining cases that have struggled with those definitions have been far less generous to mayors on questions about their powers of general supervising and their powers as the chief executive of the city In Hawkins v City of Fayette 604 S W 2d 716 Mo Ct App 1980 the mayor seeking additional compensation for extra duties testified that his duties included supervising all city employees except the city collector and being at the city power plant 3 to 7 times daily during the installation of a new engine which duties went on for 6 or 7 months At 721 A statute also provided that the mayor shall exercise a general supervision over all the offices and affairs of the city At 721 But the court rejected his claim to extra compensation reasoning that the mayor s power of general supervising does not extend to detailed supervision The court relied on the definition of general supervision in an earlier case involving an insurance policy In which it was held that the words meant a supervision of an independent contractors work only to the extent necessary to see that the work was done in accordance with the contract and specifications to cut and trim trees in the area of transmission lines which work was done by the insured employees which then could have been excluded from the policy coverage Analogously here the words of s 79 12 mean only that the mayor shall exercise a general supervision over all offices and affairs of the city only to the extent to see that the state laws and city ordinances are complied with these being the further words of the statute At 722 The court did not discuss the question of whether the city had a weak mayor form of government but it did point out that apparently the city manager resigned the day the mayor became mayor which was the reason the mayor was supervising the city employees Presumably the city manager had there been one would have been responsible for the detailed management of the city Chief of Police of Chelsea v Mayor of Chelsea 488 N E 2d 424 Appeals Ct Mass 2986 appears particularly instructive on the question of what grants of executive and general supervisory powers to mayors means in municipal charters and statutes There the question was which of the mayor or police chief had the authority to designate police officers to specific shifts days off and job assignments At 424 The contest said the court was whether ordinances and regulations based on them or the city charter prevailed If a conflict exists continued the court the charter controls At 425 Section 3 of the charter said the court provided that to the extent pertinent that the government of the city and the general management and control of all its affairs shall be vested in a single officer to be called the mayor and in a legislative body to be called the board of aldermen The powers of the mayor relevant to this controversy are set out in 50 and 51 Section 50 describes the mayor as the chief executive officer of the city and except as otherwise provided herein vests in the mayor executive powers which shall be exercised by him either personally or through the several officers and boards in their respective departments under his general supervision and control The chief of police is appointed by the mayor subject to the approval of the aldermen and holds office until a successor is appointed See 51 Ordinances are established by the board of aldermen and once approved by the mayor or under 42 continue in force until amended or repealed 40 At 425 As to the ordinances governing the police department the court pointed out that Section 12 4 of the revised ordinances declares that the chief of police shall have entire control of the police department its officers and members subject however to the provisions of section 50 of the city charter The chief is required by 13 7 to enforce the ordinances and orders of the mayor and board of aldermen By 13 9 power was conferred upon the chief to make such rules and regulations for the conduct and control of the police department as he deems advisable the same being subject to the approval of the mayor and board of aldermen At 425 26 Under those ordinances the aldermen and mayor approved rules and regulations which define the chiefs responsibilities and power including among those therein set out are designations of police officers to specific shifts days off and job assignments or as characterized by the chief and fairly we think the authority to make daily operational decisions At 426 The court then narrowly interpreted the powers of the mayor Pointing to 50 the mayor contends that the city s executive powers were intended to vest exclusively in

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/30df26a0b64a82d785257715005515bc?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Alderman Declines Salary
    want to be paid for his position as an alderman Do we need anything besides a signed memo from him for the file Answer Believe it or not the Town should write him the check and he can then donate it back This is not a requirement in the law but is highly suggested by Stephanie Allen MTAS Attorney Evidently there have been cases where creditors have gone after an

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/9247a0ad0019178b85257de800629852?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Alderman Operating a Municipal Vehicle as a Police Car and Stopping Citizens
    for traffic violations rarely if ever is there a breach of the peace or any of the offenses contemplated in those statutes involved in such violations In fact it is easy to imagine a breach of the peace precipitated by the alderman himself when the motorist discovers that he has been stopped not by an authorized officer but an alderman The possibilities for trouble beyond that point are endless There are other limitations on an aldermen functioning as a police officer Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 55 8 1 1 2 A an Authorized emergency vehicle means vehicles of the fire department fire patrol police vehicles and such ambulances and emergency vehicles as are designated or authorized by the commissioner or the chief of police of an incorporated city The operators of emergency vehicles have certain privileges and significant responsibilities under Tennessee Code Annotated section 55 8 108 However the operator of a vehicle which does not qualify as an emergency vehicle within the meaning of that statute is denied any protection under it even if the vehicle is obviously an emergency vehicle operating with full emergency equipment An ambulance driver discovered that in Nash Wilson Funeral Home Inc v Greer 57 Tenn App 191 417 S W 2d 562 1966 An alderman operating an unauthorized emergency vehicle with lights which suggest that it is a police vehicle might also find himself in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 55 9 202 and or 55 9 402 which prescribe and restrict the lights that may be used on vehicles including authorized emergency vehicles in Tennessee An alderman would be foolish to use his personal vehicle as a police car if he understood the breathtaking personal liability involved in its use in that fashion In fact I have no doubt that if his insurance company knew that the vehicle was being used for that purpose he would find himself faced either with skyrocketing insurance rates or no insurance at all But the principal liability issue in the alderman s use of his vehicle as a law enforcement vehicle is the one involving the city There is more than a good possibility that if the alderman either injures someone or violates their constitutional rights in the process of acting as a police officer the city would be liable for those injuries or violations under the Tennessee Tort Liability Act or 42 U S C Section 1983 respectively Under the Tennessee Tort Liability Act Tennessee Code Annotated section 29 20 101 et seq a municipality is liable for the operation of a motor vehicle or other equipment by an employee acting within the scope of his employment Tennessee Code Annotated section 29 20 202 and for the negligent acts and omissions of its employees within the scope of their employment Tennessee Code Annotated section 29 20 205 An alderman qualifies as an employee within the meaning of that Act Tennessee Code Annotated section 29 20 102 and with respect to the negligent operation

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/3940114f804d4ed085256c30006a69b4?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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