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  • Knowledgebase-Application of Jackson Law to Private Landfill
    by the companies and not for county or municipal waste or household garbage In my opinion the Jackson Law does not apply to such a landfill The Jackson Law requires local approval by the county and the municipality if any in which a landfill is to be located that will accept municipal and county solid waste and household garbage This law also establishes procedures for the granting of this approval This law is a local option law for the county or municipality in question and I will assume for purposes of this opinion that it has been locally approved by the applicable jurisdictions The operative provision of this law that provides an exception from these requirements for private landfills is T C A 68 211 706 a The provisions of this part shall not apply to any private landfill which accepts solid waste solely generated by its owner and does not accept county or municipal solid waste or ordinary household garbage The landfill in question is proposed as a joint venture between Company A and Company B It will accept only solid waste generated by these companies It will not receive solid waste from any other source including the county or municipality or households I also note that the zoning ordinance of your City must be amended to allow the landfill to be located in what is now a rural residential district by changing the area to heavy manufacturing The proposed amendment allowing the landfill in the heavy manufacturing district and including it as a permitted principal use is Company C Landfill Operations which accepts sic solid waste generated by its owners and does not accept county or municipal solid waste or ordinary household garbage subject to approval of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation Division of Solid Waste

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/04a7214e23b2fc948525727b0050fba2?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Application of Municipal Budget Law of 1982
    56 202 which is part of this law provides that The provisions of this part apply to any municipality that does not have budget provisions at least as detailed as provided by 6 56 203 1 and 3 contained in its charter 6 56 203 1 requires the budget ordinance to include estimated expenditures by department board office and agency expenditures for corresponding items for the preceding year projected expenditures for the current year and reasons for recommended departures in detail prescribed by the governing body All monies except those accounted for in a proprietary or fiduciary fund and properly excluded from the budget ordinance must be included in the budget ordinance A municipality may not expend money from any source including bond and note proceeds grants and loans and special assessments except in accordance with a budget ordinance or a proprietary or fiduciary fund 6 56 203 3 requires the budget ordinance to contain estimates of anticipated revenues from all sources The ordinance must also contain a comparative statement of the amounts received from each source for the preceding fiscal year the current year and the coming year in detail prescribed by the governing body Although 7 of your City s charter Chapter No 65 Private Acts of 1905 as amended has fairly detailed budget ordinance requirements it does not have certain requirements that are included in the Municipal Budget Law of 1982 In the provisions relative to estimated expenditures for example this section of the City s charter does not have a requirement that the budget ordinance contain expenditures for the preceding year and reasons for recommended departures Similarly in provisions regarding anticipated revenues there is no provision in the City s charter requiring a comparative statement of amounts received for the previous and current year Therefore based

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/3ac17dd5ca98517a85256be50067d74c?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Application of Nepotism Policy to Employee Whose Brother is Elected to Council
    legalistic use of it This is why most careful drafters and there are few of these indeed avoid the use of shall to indicate tense confining its use to directing action and write statutes and ordinances in the present tense The word employed creates even more ambiguity and the interpretation given to this word is the real crux of the matter It can mean either initially hired or continuously working for an employer in this case the Town So almost every word of the sentence contributes its own ambiguous meaning to the ambiguity of the whole There are two 2 things the above ordinance provision can mean that perhaps are clearer stated as follows 1 The Town may not hire a member of the immediate family of an elected Town official as an employee or 2 A member of the immediate family of an elected Town official may not be an employee of the Town Under the first statement the brother who is already an employee could continue as an employee because he was hired before the other brother was elected Under the second statement the employee brother would have to resign or the elected brother not take office because an immediate family member of an elected official cannot be an employee of the Town Because of this ambiguity a court that was asked to apply this language would try to determine what the intent and purpose of enacting it were I believe that in interpreting the language of the nepotism provision as a whole a court would conclude that the second statement above was what was intended The first place the court would look probably is the ordinance itself to see if there are any clues in other parts of the ordinance to the meaning of the language in question Since you sent only one page of the personnel ordinance I assume there is no definitions section where the word employed is defined It happens however that the phrase shall be employed is also used in the first sentence of the nepotism section The pertinent part of this sentence reads No member of an immediate family shall be employed under the same line of supervision Here the phrase is obviously referring to continuous employment rather than just initial hiring If it were otherwise the apparent purpose of the restriction could be thwarted by the initial hiring of a person in a different line of supervision and then transferring the person to the line of supervision under the family member Since the phrase shall be employed is used in both sentences prohibiting nepotism and these sentences are next to each other I think it is reasonable to assume it means the same in both sentences It seems clear that the phrase in the first sentence refers to continuous employment rather than initial hiring so I must conclude it refers to continuous employment in the second It would have been so easy to use the words hire or initially hire in

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/90fba0f251e644b585256e0c006de649?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Application of Sunshine Law to Certain Personnel Processes
    consisting of two 2 or more members but clearly do not meet the second part of the definition of having authority to make decisions for or recommendations to a public body The recommendations of these panels were made to the city manager who is the official under your City s charter with authority to hire the police chief Chapter No 380 Private Acts of 1972 as amended 4 03 and 17 01 The city manager is not a public body but an administrative officer In Fain v Faculty of the College of Law of the University of Tennessee 522 S W 2d 752 Tenn App 1977 the Dean of the College of Law set up committees to advise him on administering the law school Plaintiffs claimed that these committees could trace their ultimate origin to the Legislature and that they were therefore governing bodies to which the Sunshine Law would apply The Court disagreed and held The committees exist by virtue of having been created by the Dean They derive their authority from the Dean Their authority is to make recommendations to the Dean The Dean is not a public body he is an administrative officer Consequently the faculty meetings and committee meetings of the College of Law are not subject to the provisions of the Act 552 S W 2d at 754 The parallels to your situation are obvious In Metropolitan Air Research Testing Authority Inc v Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County 842 S W 2d 611 Tenn App 1992 a group of city officials with different roles in purchasing met in the Mayor s office with the purchasing agent to make recommendations relative to a contract An unsuccessful bidder claimed this meeting violated the Sunshine Law In rejecting this contention the Court held T he group was neither created nor recognized by the Metropolitan Charter the city ordinances or the rules and regulations of the Division of Purchases The group was not required to have a quorum or to deliberate or even to make recommendations to a public body The decision on whether to award the contract rested with the purchasing agent At most the officials attending the meeting were providing the purchasing agent with their opinions concerning whether he should award the contract to the company that submitted the lowest bid The purchasing agent could have made a decision without the meeting Accordingly we find that the Sunshine Law did not require this meeting to be open to the public 842 S W 2d at 619 Since these panels of citizens were not making their recommendations to a public body but to an individual administrative official the city manager they do not fit the definition of governing body under the Sunshine Law The gatherings of the panels for interviews were not meetings under the Sunshine Law T C A 8 44 102 b 2 defines meeting as the convening of a governing body of a public body for which a quorum is required in order

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/5cd58a43544ae2d485256b6b0049ee0d?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Application of the Preexisting Nonconforming Use Law on Certain Property
    period it was damaged and being reconstructed Under Tennessee Code Annotated 13 7 208 g 2 the reconstructive period tolls the 30 month time limitation provided building permits were secured within that period Question 3 Extent of damage The city claims that its ordinance does not allow reconstruction if it the nonconforming use is damaged more than 60 of its sales value immediately prior to damage That provision of the ordinance plainly conflicts with the language of Tennessee Code Annotated 13 7 208 itself which provides that No building permit or like permission for demolition construction or landscaping shall be denied to an industry or business seeking to destroy and reconstruct facilities necessary to the continued conduct of the activities of that industry or business Nothing in that statute remotely suggests that even if the nonconforming use had burnt to the ground or been swept entirely away in a flood the property owner could not reconstruct the use It is difficult for me to believe that the courts would appreciate the difference between the destruction of an industry or business by an act of God and its destruction by the owner of the industry or business for the purposes of the reconstruction of the industry or business Question 4 Is residential rental property a business within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated 13 7 208 The answer to that question is not clear in Tennessee As far as I can determine the only cases on the application of that statute to residential property are unreported and involve mobile homes in mobile home parks or courts In Clouse v Cook 1988 WL 34834 Tenn the City of Franklin annexed a mobile home court in 1969 At the time of the annexation the city had an ordinance that permitted nonconforming uses to continue for 25 years In 1985 the owners of the mobile home court sought to demolish and replace two of the 70 units in the court The city argued that the mobile home court was not entitled to replace the units because the court was not an industrial commercial or other business establishment and for that reason was not protected by Tennessee Code Annotated 13 7 208 The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the city s claim reasoning that Plaintiffs rent 70 units on a weekly basis in an area designated as a trailer court or trailer park No rational person would have referred to the units that plaintiffs demolished as single family residences or residences of any character This record is silent with respect to the number of units that are occupied by transients or longer term tenants but the units in the Battlefield Trailer court were referred to by the building inspector and others as mobile homes and in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals as mobile homes or house trailers The very nature of a trailer court or trailer park containing house trailers and mobile homes give rise to the assumption of transient occupancy as distinguished

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/b91a8e73eaead4b28525723a004c14fa?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Applying City Zoning and Building Code Regulations to County Buildings
    Laws and regulations Public facilities Intergovernmental relations Zoning Laws and regulations Type Legal Opinion Legal Opinion Reference Documents AG opinions available in MOLLY Text of Document June 24 1994 Your question is can the City apply its zoning and building code regulations including that requirement that the county obtain a building permit and pay building permit fees to county buildings The answer is no where such buildings are used in the county s governmental capacity In support of my opinion I have enclosed Tennessee Attorney General s Opinion to the Town of Dandridge dated March 11 1985 and a letter from the Tennessee Department of Education to the Marion County School Board dated September 28 1976 In my opinion both that opinion and that letter reflect a correct statement of the law Note that the Tennessee Attorney General s Opinion applies to county buildings used in a governmental capacity As I told you on the telephone yesterday that probably would not cover a spec building built by the county because such a building is not used in a governmental capacity In other words a spec building probably would be required to conform to the city s zoning and building code

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/e2485e920272ff1885256c560055976b?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Applying Tennessee's Preexisting Nonconforming Use Law to Fireworks Establishments
    establishments and what police powers a municipality can exercise against such establishments Original Author Hemsley Sid Co Author Product Create Date 06 12 2003 Last Reviewed on 04 19 2010 Subject Zoning Laws and regulations Tennessee Zoning Fireworks Type Legal Opinion Legal Opinion Reference Documents Text of Document Please remember that these legal opinions were written based on the facts of a given city at a certain time The laws

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/fe54f351fde6a72d85256d4800426034?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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  • Knowledgebase-Applying the Open Space Requirements in the City's Zoning Ordinance to Abutting Land in the County Zoned Residential
    the property in Edison Township upon which the shopping center was to be built was zoned residential The plans for the shopping center included no buffer However upon being advised by its attorney that the buffer was required to protect both the resident of Edison Township and Woodbridge Township the Edison Township Council rescinded the permit As you might expect everybody in the Townships of Edison and Woodbridge including the defendant shopping center sued everybody else over the question of whether Edison Township s buffer zone applied to Woodbridge Township The Court held that it did Conceding that the buffer provision in the Edison Township Zoning Ordinance did not affirmatively declare that the buffer strip was to be applicable to all adjacent residential areas inside and outside Edison Township the Court reasoned that omission presumably resulted from the fact that no one mentioned the subject rather than from any deliberate intent to confine the afforded protection to residents of Edison Township alone However the Count did not stop there reasoning that To us elemental decency dictated that all of the surrounding residents be given fair and equal protection and we have no substantial reason for believing that the members of Edison s governing body ever entertained views to the contrary Indeed if in the circumstances at hand the governing body had disregarded the consideration of fairness and had deliberately sought to provide a buffer strip requirement for the side which housed adjacent Edison residents while excluding any buffer strip requirement for the side which housed adjacent Woodbridge residents its action would presumably have been stricken by the courts New Jersey has since early times prided itself on the availability of broad judicial review affording its citizens wide protection against arbitrary capricious or unreasonable official conduct Citations omitted Our cases have long recognized the duty of municipal officials to look beyond municipal lines in the discharge of their zoning responsibilities It must be borne in mind that there could be no rational basis for denying to the adjacent Woodbridge residents the landscaped buffer protection afforded to the Edison residents The noises from the shopping center the lights from the store windows the lights in the parking areas and the fumes from the cars along with the other disturbances will have as much of an adverse effect on the nearby Woodbridge residents as they will on the nearby Edison residents If a buffer strip is reasonably required for the protection of the Edison residents it is reasonably required for the protection of the Woodbridge residents who justly claim equal treatment I am confident that if the Tennessee courts were presented with a similar question they would reach the same result although perhaps for different reasons I am not sure they would directly mention the breadth of judicial review on the issue of arbitrary capricious or unreasonable official conduct that exists in Tennessee or issues of equal protection However I have no doubt they would recognize the duty of municipal officials to look

    Original URL path: http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/cae6677dbd7f74a5852573ae005a41d4/6179c0045dfc627185256c56005475c4?OpenDocument (2015-11-11)
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