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  • The Twilight of the Setter? Local School Finance in a Time of Institutional Change | Becker-Friedman Institute Research Respository
    secure protocol such as HTTPS You can switch to HTTPS by trying to view this page again after changing the URL in your browser s location bar to begin with https instead of http Please contact site admin for help if this error continues User login CNetID or Username Password Request new password Log in The Twilight of the Setter Local School Finance in a Time of Institutional Change Authors

    Original URL path: http://econresearch.uchicago.edu/content/twilight-setter-local-school-finance-time-institutional-change (2015-06-03)
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  • Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households | Becker-Friedman Institute Research Respository
    User login CNetID or Username Password Request new password Log in Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households We examine causes and consequences of relative income within households We establish that gender identity in particular an aversion to the wife earning more than the husband impacts marriage formation the wife s labor force participation the wife s income conditional on working marriage satisfaction likelihood of divorce and the division of home production The distribution of the share of household income earned by the wife exhibits a sharp cliff at 0 5 which suggests that a couple is less willing to match if her income exceeds his Within marriage markets when a randomly chosen woman becomes more likely to earn more than a randomly chosen man marriage rates decline Within couples if the wife s potential income based on her demographics is likely to exceed the husband s the wife is less likely to be in the labor force and earns less than her potential if she does work Couples where the wife earns more than the husband are less satisfied with their marriage and are more likely to divorce Finally based on time use surveys the gender gap in non

    Original URL path: http://econresearch.uchicago.edu/content/gender-identity-and-relative-income-within-households (2015-06-03)
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  • The Right Type of Legislator | Becker-Friedman Institute Research Respository
    http Please contact site admin for help if this error continues User login CNetID or Username Password Request new password Log in The Right Type of Legislator Research suggests that U S legislators represent their richer constituents We show theoretically that this is due to the institutional structure in the US in which legislators are expected to provide particularistic benefits to their constituents We develop a citizen candidate model of redistribution between both rich and poor citizens and between legislative districts where citizens that are more productive in the private sector are also more effective at directing transfers to their district if elected to a public office When competition between legislators to secure funds for their districts is weak tax rates are set by the median voter of the median district However when competition between legislators is strong all districts prefer legislators who are successful in the private sector As these citizen candidates will be richer than the median voter of the median district this will lead in equilibrium to lower redistribution between rich and poor We show that this result is exacerbated by larger legislatures and cannot be prevented by almost entirely policy motivated parties with perfect control over

    Original URL path: http://econresearch.uchicago.edu/content/right-type-legislator (2015-06-03)
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  • Trading and Information Diffusion in Over-the-Counter Markets | Becker-Friedman Institute Research Respository
    in your browser s location bar to begin with https instead of http Please contact site admin for help if this error continues User login CNetID or Username Password Request new password Log in Trading and Information Diffusion in Over the Counter Markets We model trading and information diffusion in OTC markets when dealers can engage in many bilateral transactions at the same time We show that information diffusion is effective but not efficient While each bilateral price partially reveals all dealers private information after a single round of trading dealers could learn more even within the constraints imposed by our environment This is not a result of dealers market power but arises from the interaction between decentralization and differences in dealers valuation of the asset We also derive empirical predictions on the connection of transaction size its cost and the opaqueness of the asset and confront several explanations for the disruption of OTC markets with stylized facts from the empirical literature with the help of our framework We find more support for narratives emphasizing increased counterparty risk as opposed to increased informational frictions Authors Peter Kondor Central European University Ana Babus Imperial College London Publication Date April 2013 BFI

    Original URL path: http://econresearch.uchicago.edu/content/trading-and-information-diffusion-over-counter-markets (2015-06-03)
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  • Multitask, Accountability, and Institutional Design | Becker-Friedman Institute Research Respository
    admin for help if this error continues User login CNetID or Username Password Request new password Log in Multitask Accountability and Institutional Design We consider a model of political accountability that allows us to examine the implications of unified vs divided executive authority for the welfare of voters The government is responsible for different tasks and the voter attempts to learn about the task specific competences of the incumbent leader s in order to make electoral decisions We identify a variety of trade offs that shed light on the conditions under which it is optimal to bundle the tasks into a single elected office or unbundle the tasks into separate elected offices Voter welfare is multi faceted voters care both about the strength of the incentives they create for politicians to take good actions and about identifying and retaining high quality politicians creating the possibility for trade offs in the institutional comparison We show that as voter welfare puts greater weight on a particular task or as a politician s task specific competences become more highly correlated unbundling becomes more desirable relative to bundling with respect to creating incentives but less desirable with respect to selecting high quality politicians For

    Original URL path: http://econresearch.uchicago.edu/content/multitask-accountability-and-institutional-design (2015-06-03)
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  • Firm Volatility in Granular Networks | Becker-Friedman Institute Research Respository
    bar to begin with https instead of http Please contact site admin for help if this error continues User login CNetID or Username Password Request new password Log in Firm Volatility in Granular Networks We propose a model of firm volatility based on customer supplier connectedness We assume that customers growth rate shocks influence the growth rates of their suppliers larger suppliers have more customers and the strength of a customer supplier link depends on the size of the customer firm When the size distribution becomes more dispersed economic activity is concentrated among a smaller number of firms the typical supplier becomes less diversified and its volatility increases The model is consistent with a set of new stylized facts At the macro level the firm volatility distribution is driven by firm size dispersion the latter explains common movements in firm level total and residual volatility At the micro level we show that the concentration of customer networks is an important determinant of firm level volatility Authors Bryan T Kelly University of Chicago Booth School of Business Hanno N Lustig University of California Los Angeles Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh New York University Publication Date March 2013 BFI Initiative Fiscal Studies JEL Classification

    Original URL path: http://econresearch.uchicago.edu/content/firm-volatility-granular-networks (2015-06-03)
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  • Who Should Pay for Credit Ratings and How? | Becker-Friedman Institute Research Respository
    User login CNetID or Username Password Request new password Log in Who Should Pay for Credit Ratings and How This paper analyzes a model where investors use a credit rating to decide whether to finance a firm The rating quality depends on the unobservable effort exerted by a credit rating agency CRA We analyze optimal compensation schemes for the CRA that differ depending on whether a social planner the firm or investors order the rating We find that rating errors are larger when the firm orders it than when investors do However investors ask for ratings inefficiently often Which arrangement leads to a higher social surplus depends on the agents prior beliefs about the project quality We also show that competition among CRAs causes them to reduce their fees put in less effort and thus leads to less accurate ratings Rating quality also tends to be lower for new securities Finally we and that optimal contracts that provide incentives for both initial ratings and their subsequent revisions can lead the CRA to be slow to acknowledge mistakes Authors Anil Kashyap University of Chicago Booth School of Business Natalia Kovrijnykh Arizona State University Publication Date March 2013 JEL Classification D82 Asymmetric

    Original URL path: http://econresearch.uchicago.edu/content/who-should-pay-credit-ratings-and-how (2015-06-03)
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  • The Market for OTC Derivatives | Becker-Friedman Institute Research Respository
    protocol such as HTTPS You can switch to HTTPS by trying to view this page again after changing the URL in your browser s location bar to begin with https instead of http Please contact site admin for help if this error continues User login CNetID or Username Password Request new password Log in The Market for OTC Derivatives We develop a model of equilibrium entry trade and price formation in over the counter OTC markets Banks trade derivatives to share an aggregate risk subject to two trading frictions they must pay a fixed entry cost and they must limit the size of the positions taken by their traders because of risk management concerns Although all banks in our model are endowed with access to the same trading technology some large banks endogenously arise as dealers trading mainly to provide intermediation services while medium sized banks endogenously participate as customers mainly to share risks We use the model to address positive questions regarding the growth in OTC markets as trading frictions decline and normative questions of how regulation of entry impacts welfare Authors Andrew G Atkeson University of California Los Angeles Andrea L Eisfeldt University of California Los Angeles Pierre

    Original URL path: http://econresearch.uchicago.edu/content/market-otc-derivatives (2015-06-03)
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